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The real is never "what one might believe"; it is what one should have been thinking. 
Empirical knowledge is lucid only after the event, after the apparatus of reasoning has been 
set in motion. 
- Gaston Bachelard 1938 (1969) The Formation of the Scientific Mind p.13. 
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Samandrag. 
Eksperimentell molekylær medisin har dei siste 60 åra vakse til å bli ei stor grein innan dei 
medisinske vitskapane. Eksperimentell molekylær medisin studerer korleis dei biologiske 
makromolekyla protein, karbohydrat, nukleinsyrer (DNA) og lipid påverkar helse og 
sjukdom. Kunnskapen frå den eksperimentelle molekylære medisinen har forma vår 
forståing av liv og av sjukdom. 
I denne studien har eg stilt spørsmålet om korleis eksperimentell molekylær biologi 
produserar kunnskap. For å kaste lys over denne problemstillinga har eg diskutert to linjer 
innan vitskapsfilosofien og medisinen. Den første er korleis Claude Bernard i den tidlige 
Franske positivismen si ånd utvikla eksperimentell medisin som vitskap. Den andre linja eg 
har diskutert kan representerast av tenkjerar som Gaston Bachelard, Bruno Latour, og Hans-
Jörg Rheinberger. Dei peika på at dei sosiale, teknologiske og historiske faktorane som 
spelar inn i kunnskapsproduksjonen.   
Eg har freista å gi ei forståing av eksperimentell molekylær medisin som integrerer sosiale, 
teknologiske og materielle faktorar. Den eksperimentelle tilnærminga til liv og helse er 
mogleggjort av eit syn på liv som utelukkande bygd opp etter fysiokjemiske lover. Det 
eksperimentelle arbeidet er teoretisk-praktisk, og det eksperimentelle systemet dannar ei 
teoretisk-materiell matrise av forståing der nye fenomen kan dannast. Kva eksperiment som 
skal gjerast, og dermed kva kunnskap som skal produserast, er ei avveging mellom ulike 
praktiske og taktiske omsyn. Forskarane vil søke å maksimere produksjonen av viktige 
vitskaplige utsegner. Dei vitskaplige utsegnene vert gitt verdi etter om dei er meir eller 
mindre relevante for vitskaplige og medisinske målsetjingar. 
Det andre spørsmålet eg har stilt i denne oppgåva er om ein filosofisk refleksjon over 
kunnskapsproduksjonen kan føre til ein vitskaplig sjølvrefleksjon, kritikk, og endring av 
kunnskapsproduksjonen. Georges Canguilhem har vist korleis vitskaplige omgrep opnar for 
nye vitskaplige spørsmål, forståingar og teoriar. Canguilhem utvikla omgrepet "biologisk 
normativitet" - at det levande grunnleggande kjenneteiknast av at det ikkje er likegyldig til 
sin eigen tilstand. På bakgrunn omgrepet "biologisk normativitet" dette har eg forsøkt å 
diskutere korleis molekylær medisin kan endrast ved å legge meir vekt på å forstå korleis 
molekylærbiologiske fenomen fungerar i ein biologisk og medisinsk kontekst. 
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Aim of study. 
In thousands of molecular medicine research laboratories in the world people are every day 
crouching over their experiments. Every year governments and private organizations direct 
large amounts of funding into these laboratories with the hope that their scientific work shall 
bring health and prosperity. Every year the number of research papers indexed at the 
biomedical database PubMed has been steadily increasing, passing 800.000 per year in 
20081.  
During the latter 60 years this companionship between medicine and molecular biology that 
is molecular medicine has yielded not only new types of diagnosis and therapy. It has 
sparked debates concerning ethical, political, and philosophical dimensions, such as what it 
is to be human, and what possibilities there are there and should there be for intervening in 
life. R. Reininger claimed that our image of the world is always a display of values2. The 
position of experimental molecular medicine in our society is also a reflexion of the view of 
life and health in our society.  
The focal point for this study is the process by which by the researchers produce knowledge 
in experimental molecular medicine. My main question raised is: how does the researcher 
produce knowledge within the field of experimental molecular medicine. I am myself a 
researcher within the field of molecular medicine. Every morning I head for the 
laboratory/office for new experiments, new hypotheses, and reading papers; training in 
conducting experiments in order to gain relevant and trustable knowledge. Therefore, a 
second question in this work is: can a philosophical reflection over the knowledge 
production in experimental molecular medicine go into a self-reflection and change of the 
knowledge production itself?  
The objects of study for molecular medicine are the biological macromolecules defined as 
proteins, nucleic acids, carbohydrates, and lipids, and how these relate to human health and 
disease. Experimental molecular medicine is based upon the presupposition that the 
                                                
1 http://preview.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/ 
2 "Unser Weltbilt is immer zugleich ein Wertbilt", Reininger, R., Wertphilosophie und Ethik Die Frage nach dem Sinn des 
Lebens als Grundlage Einer Wertordnung, 1939. Vienna-Leipzig, Braümuller, p. 29. Quoted in Canguilhem 1991 p. 179. 
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physiochemical workings of the biological macromolecules are relevant for the state of the 
organism. Knowledge about the organism at a molecular level will thus be relevant for 
prevention and treatment of disease. This frames and motivates experimental molecular 
medicine as a knowledge-producing activity. 
This object of study of experimental molecular medicine brings with it some important 
characteristics. First, the high complexity of biological systems makes generalizations and 
predictions difficult in biological sciences. The planning and interpretation of experiments is 
dependent on the specific knowledge about the particular phenomenon studied. Molecular 
medical knowledge takes the form of an elaborate network of statements about particular 
phenomena rather than a system of principles and laws. Secondly, the medical notions of 
"health" and "disease" show that it is not life itself that is the object of study. It is rather the 
pathological states, and how these can be detected, prevented and cured.  
The methodological principle for studying life at the molecular level in experimental 
molecular medicine is the controlled experiment. Experiments are designed on the 
background of observations and previous knowledge. There are some considerations that I 
will emphasize connected to the experimental approach. First, the experimental setups used 
to study life at a molecular level are themselves are technological results of a scientific 
process, and thus they embody scientific concepts. Secondly, the experimental approach is 
just that: an approach. It produces a certain type of knowledge, and which further shape the 
resulting understandings about the molecular level of organisms. Thirdly, the experimental 
process is a practical process. Therefore the process of knowledge production is dependent 
on the performance of the scientists, and the output of the process is dependent on the 
choices, priorities and organization of the practical process. 
Taken together, this emphasizes the importance of understanding knowledge production in 
experimental molecular medicine as a theory-practice: it is theory and practice at the same 
time. The theoretical knowledge within the field is shaped by the experimental approach, and 
the experimental process which directly involves the theoretical knowledge. The theory is 
value-laden through the connection to medicine, and this further affects choices and 
decisions in the experimental conduct. In order to understand the knowledge production of 
experimental molecular medicine we need concepts that can capture its hybrid 
characteristics. In this work I will try to give a description of experimental molecular 
University of Bergen 
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medicine that captures these hybrid aspects: how is experimental molecular medicine 
constituted as an approach for studying life and disease? What is the relation between theory 
and practice, and how is the scientific conduct performed in order to produce statements 
about the world? 
In part 1 I will present some thinkers that have addressed the question of how knowledge is 
produced in the experimental life sciences. The development of medicine as a scientific 
discipline has been connected, at least in France, to positivist philosophy. I will therefore 
briefly describe positivist philosophy and its connection to the development of medicine, 
before I go more into detail on how Claude Bernard established the principles of 
experimental medicine as a scientific approach. Further, I will give a short overview of some 
thinkers that criticized the positivist approach to science, and emphasized the historical, 
situated and subjective aspect of scientific work, before I look at how Steve Woolgar & 
Bruno Latour, and Hans-Jörg Rheinberger have studied the practice of experimental 
molecular medicine. This presentation of is neither a purely historic nor systematic 
presentation. The aim is rather to give a context for the discussions, problems, and 
approaches presented in this work. I will end part 1 by discussing these works with respect to 
the questions raised in the aims of this work. 
If scientific activity is specific, context-dependent, and situated, a source of important 
addressing specific scientific cases is an important source of insights. In part 2 I will present 
a case study of a work within experimental molecular medicine, namely the NAT-research 
group at the University of Bergen. This case study is not chosen randomly: I am myself 
working within this project. As I am myself an actor and a stakeholder in the project, I am 
aware that this will color my study. On the other hand I have detailed knowledge about the 
field and the process. Indeed, seeing the long-standing tradition of self-reflection in 
philosophy of science, this subjectivity and involvement will also hopefully yield some 
interesting perspectives.  
In the part 3 I will use the case study from part 2 and the theories presented in part 1 to try to 
give an account of how knowledge is produced within the field of experimental molecular 
medicine. More specific, I will try to understand how the preconditions of experimental 
molecular medicine are tied together with the practical-theoretical process of knowledge 
production, and what kind of knowledge is the output of this process. I will try to develop 
Kristian Kobbenes Starheim 
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some of the notions and theories given in part 1 to formulate the experimental approach of 
molecular medicine as a value-laden, situated theory-practice co-produced together with a 
certain view of life and disease. 
An understanding of experimental molecular medicine as both practices, knowledge 
production, and world views, will enable us to intervene in the theory-practice in order to 
reflect upon the values and views that exist within the field. In part 4 I will address the 
second question of this thesis, namely whether a philosophical reflection over experimental 
molecular medicine can go into a critical reflection and intervention of the science itself. To 
address this, I will first discuss how Canguilhem develops the notion of normativity of life as 
an alternative to the reductionistic emphasis of the experimental medicine. Secondly, I will 
discuss whether there exists conceptions of life in the molecular life sciences that address 
what Canguilhem calls the original aspects of life. Thirdly, I will see whether these 
conceptions together with Canguilhems normative biology can form the basis for a re-
thinking of the experimental life sciences, before I in part 5 will come with a conclusion of 
the work. 
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1. Philosophy of the experimental life sciences. 
The laboratory as a place for conducting controlled experiments emerged in the mid-19th 
century. The laboratory proved itself fruitful in generating new knowledge about organisms. 
In the 20th century technological developments made it possible to study organisms at a sub-
cellular level, and molecular biology emerged as a scientific discipline. In addition to the 
technological basis, molecular biology included elements from genetics, biochemistry, 
microbiology, physics, chemistry, and informatics. The development of molecular biology 
was closely attached to medicine, continuing the laboratory tradition from experimental 
medicine (Rheinberger, 1990).  
I will start by drawing up two lines of understanding science which are both important for 
understanding the development of experimental molecular medicine as a science, and for 
understanding how the scientific activity is socially, technologically and practically 
constituted. The first line of thought is represented by the early French positivism. The 
positivism of Comte and others was concerned with describing a scientific rationality, where 
the scientific conduct is governed by logical and rational principles. This positivism was 
connected to the establishment of several of the natural sciences in the 19th century, 
including medicine. It is therefore interesting with respect to how experimental molecular 
medicine gained its foundation and legitimacy. The other line of thought is that part of 
philosophy in the 20th century that pointed at scientific knowledge production as a social 
activity situated in particular places at particular times. The works of Gaston Bachelard, 
Michel Polanyi, and Michel Foucault exemplifies this line. These works problematize the 
view of science as a rational activity that produces objective knowledge about the world. 
They show several of the values, practical aspects and social mechanisms that constitute 
scientific work as a temporally and spatially situated activity. Indeed, it is these works that 
have highlighted the hybrid aspect of science.  
In the following of part 1 I will go more into detail of some thinkers that address the 
problems raised in the above presented lines of thought. In order to understand the basis of 
experimental molecular medicine I will go through the principles of experimental medicine, 
as formulated by the physician Claude Bernard in "Principles of experimental medicine". 
Further, I will briefly go through how thinkers like Ludwik Fleck, Gaston Bachelard, 
Kristian Kobbenes Starheim 
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Georges Canguilhem, and Michel Foucault developed a philosophy where science was seen 
as a historical, situated and context-specific activity, and where the knowledge produced by 
the scientific activity was a result of multiple social, material, and technological factors. The 
conduct of experimental molecular medicine as knowledge producing activity will be 
addressed by going through the work "Laboratory Life" by Bruno Latour & Steve Woolgar. 
In this work Latour & Woolgar describe some social and rhetorical factors that are part of 
the knowledge producing process. They problematize how a social and situated process 
gives rise to what the participants of this process call "true statements about the world. Then, 
we will look at how the philosopher Hans-Jörg Rheinberger investigates how the practice 
and technology of experimentation is connected to the body of knowledge in order to 
produce new knowledge. In the end of part 1 I will summarize the presented works and how 
they contribute to the aim of this study, namely to get an understanding of how experimental 
molecular medicine produces knowledge. 
1.1 Positivism.	  
1.1.1 Positivism	  and	  the	  development	  of	  medicine	  as	  a	  scientific	  discipline.	  
Positivism3 can be described as "a philosophical system that holds that every rationally 
justifiable assertion can be scientifically verified or is capable of logical or mathematical 
proof, and that therefore rejects metaphysics and theism"4. Thus, positivism holds 
rationalism and logic as central to thought. Positivism was closely connected to the 
development of the natural sciences, and these sciences were seen as the prime example of a 
rational, systematic, and logical understanding of the world. (Gutting, 2001 p. 8). 
The positivist approach was challenged during the mid 20th century, but its influence is still 
seen in later attempts to define rules of scientific reasoning and logic, found for example in 
rationalist philosophy and in what has been called "the received view" (Suppe, 2000). Also, 
as science has grown, several scientists and pundits (e.g. Francis Crick5 and Richard 
                                                
3 The French philosopher August Comte (1798-1857) coined the term “positivism”. Comte was a central figure within what 
is called the first wave of positivism that emerged in France during the first half of the 19th century. 
4 New Oxford American Dictionary in Apple Dictionary Version 2.1.3, 2005-2009 Apple Inc. 
5 «You», your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are 
in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules". Crick F., 1994. The 
Astonishing Hypothesis. The Scientific Search for the Soul, Charles Scrib- ner’s Sons, New York. 
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Dawkins (Dawkins, 2006)) have taken positivist-like positions. Thus, positivism continues to 
have a significant influence on the debate around the status and role of science and scientific 
knowledge. 
Medicine as a scientific discipline was established in the late early/mid 19th century. The 
problem of medicine was that it had a long tradition of craftsmanship, but it lacked 
systematic understanding and the ability to predict observations. In France, several 
philosophers and medical doctors tried to develop a scientific foundation for medicine. 
Among these were Pierre-George-Jean Cabanis, August Comte and Claude Bernard. 
Positivism was one of the philosophical movements that engaged in the establishment of a 
medical rationality (de Cuzzani, 2003). An important factor in this process was the 
objectification of disease. Through the introduction of several types of apparatus, such as the 
stethoscope, the focus of the clinician was changed from the "subjective" symptoms of the 
patient to the "objective" signs of the disease (de Cuzzani, 2003 p.32). Such signs could be 
systematically analyzed, and this led the way to the laboratory as a place for scientific 
medical analysis. In order to establish a scientific and objective medicine, Bernard proposed 
the controlled experiment as approach for obtaining medical knowledge. For Bernard the 
controlled experiment represented a material analysis, and the only way the scientist in a 
logical and controlled manner could get knowledge from the object of study.  
1.1.2 Claude	  Bernard	  and	  the	  principles	  of	  experimental	  medicine.	  
Claude Bernard (1813-1878) was a French physiologist who is known for his major 
discourse on scientific method, "An Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine" 
(1865) (Bernard, 1957)6. He revolutionized medical science by developing a scientific 
experimental methodology based on a strict marriage between physiology and the underlying 
laws of physics and chemistry. Thus he was an important figure in establishing medicine as 
an experimental science. It is this role that makes Bernard a suitable starting point for this 
study.  
                                                
6 I have in this section based my discussion of the work of Bernard on "An introduction to the Study of Experimental 
Medicine". As my aim has been to draw out, present, and discuss some concepts and aspects of the philosophy of Bernard 
that are recurrent throughout the text of Bernard, I have of practical reasons not given the citations to the exact sections, 
page numbers etc. throughout the text (except when direct citations are used). This is also the case for some other works I 
have presented in detail in this thesis, where this is indicated.  
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Bernard stated that the scientific goal of medicine is the same as for all sciences: to 
understand the laws of the phenomena so as to foresee, vary, or master these phenomena. For 
medicine more specifically, the aim is to conserve health and cure disease. This leads to the 
three branches of medicine, namely physiology: the study of normal conditions of life and 
health, pathology: the study of morbid conditions and the prevention of these, and 
therapeutics: the cure of disease with medical agents. For medicine to be scientific it needs to 
be founded on physiology, have a comparative method, and take an analytical form 
(Bernard, 1957 p. 2). Both pathology and therapeutics shall rest on the same foundation: 
experimental physiology.  
The experimental method was for Bernard to submit ideas to experience, where the only 
form for reliable explanations were material causality - cause and effect in physiochemical 
relations. Today this is a presupposition for experimental medicine, but at Bernard’s time, 
this was not obvious. Vitalistic views commonly held at the time stated that the phenomena 
of living organisms were due to forces that were qualitatively different from physiochemical 
laws; they were due to vital forces within the organism. From this vitalistic view, 
experimental intervention in the organism would disturb the vital forces and thus destroy the 
quality of life itself. Such interventions would therefore be of no sense to medicine. But 
Bernard held that the spontaneous properties of organisms were a result of underlying 
physiochemical mechanisms (Bernard, 1957 p. 61). Rather than terminating the enquiry of a 
phenomenon due to vital forces, the physician should perform an experimental intervention 
to unravel the underlying causes of the phenomenon. If medicine wanted to be scientific, 
biology had to be absolutely deterministic, using controlled experiment as its method. 
Bernard pointed at the experiment rather than the clinical observation as the scientific 
foundation of medicine. Observation in the clinic is not sufficient for unveiling the true 
causes of physiological functions or pathological states. The observation needs to be 
reformulated into a question that can be tested experimentally (Bernard, 1957 p. 12). Where 
the observer studies phenomena as nature shows them without varying their conditions, the 
experimenter disturb the phenomena in order to make them present themselves in ways 
nature does not show them. Doing an experiment is always an intentional act that produces a 
disturbance of the phenomena that are studied. By designing an experimental setup the 
experimenter will make nature reveal itself, and she/he will get the answer to the posed 
question and an explanation of the observation. Thus, an observation sparks an idea, which is 
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posed as a question, and the question is tested by a controlled experimental comparison. In 
this way the experimental method subjects the physician's ideas to experience in an ordered 
manner.  
According to Bernard, observation and experiments are two of the elements in scientific 
enquiry. In addition to observation and experiments the scientist needs ideas and facts. As 
mentioned above, the experimental intervention must start with an idea or question posed on 
the basis of an observation. From the observation the formulation of an idea is done through 
a kind of intuition where the experimenter catches sight of probable explanations for the 
observations. These explanations are on the previous knowledge within the field. Ideas and 
observations are, together with facts and experiments, the elements that build the scientific 
method. Facts are the necessary materials for thinking about nature. The facts are obtained 
by experiments. Ideas are given their content by facts, and the ideas makes up the statements 
about nature that embody science. A scientific hypothesis is a scientific idea that is 
controlled experimentally. Reasoning gives form to ideas so that the facts produced from the 
experiments leads back to an idea, which again can be tested experimentally. The 
experimentally derived fact in itself is nothing without a connected idea that gives an 
understanding of the phenomenon. 
Importantly, the experimenter must not let the preconceived idea be too dominating: the 
experimental output alone should determine whether the idea is correct or not. This is indeed 
a point that Bernard stresses: man has a tendency for making generalizations and for clinging 
to his ideas. One should therefore be aware of the "fake men of science" that create general 
theories and systems without subjecting them to experimental testing. Man does not contain 
within himself the knowledge and criterion of external things, and the systematic experience 
- the experiment must therefore be the sole authority to which all ideas must be subjected 
and tested (Bernard, 1957 p. 28). Through the experimental process, mans pride is lessened 
as he sees that the objective reality of things will forever be hidden. The scientific truth, 
which is the one the scientist can grasp, is the relations between things. Unravelling these 
relations is the goal of all sciences. Interesting with respect to the historical epistemology of 
Bachelard and Canguilhem, Bernard claims that the experimental truths rest upon 
unconscious conditions in the scientific rationality and thinking, and they can therefore only 
be known in their relation to the present state of science. No matter how novel or great their 
ideas are, scientists and their ideas is always a product of their time. 
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Bernard's caution towards generalities also transfers to how medical and biological 
phenomena are described. There is a pitfall, he says, in giving the words used to describe 
phenomena too much emphasis. They do not have meaning in themselves except for the 
phenomena they refer to. If words are put before the phenomena they describe, they bear 
with them generalizations, systems and doctrines, promoting personal views. For Bernard, 
and I will claim that this is a widespread view in the natural sciences, the material is seen as 
the primary. How the material is expressed or represented in some way through language is 
secondary. That does not mean that it is not important. Nor does it mean that Bernard has a 
naïve view on the relation between the objects of study and how they are described or 
represented by language and symbols.  
The deterministic program is not unproblematic for Bernard. Phenomena always appear as a 
result of relations with their environment. For organisms this environment can both be the 
external environment or the milieu interieur, the internal environment, of the organism. 
Indeed, the internal environment is an important notion for Bernard. Bernard used the 
internal environment to explain the spontaneous phenomena of organisms. Organic 
phenomena seemed spontaneous, but they were the result of the physiochemical mechanisms 
made possible by the internal environment of the organism (Bernard, 1957 p. 61). Also, the 
internal environment in different parts of the organisms makes possible the study of 
constituents of the organism independent of the organism as a whole. This is a 
presupposition for the experimental intervention. But, when the experimenter intervenes with 
an organism the internal environment will to some extent be disrupted. It is only for the sake 
of ease in the experimental analysis that the experimenter breaks up the organism.  
When we wish to understand the true physical quality and significance of the phenomenon, 
claims Bernard, we should always refer to its role in the whole. After the experimental 
analysis one should synthetically reconstruct the total organism in thought, reuniting and 
ordering the parts determined by analysis. But this process is indeed not simple additions or 
subtractions, but rather synthesis of complex units. When studying life one should therefore 
include the study of the organic environment. Bernard here touches upon what separates 
biology and medicine from chemistry and physics: the vital creation that unfolds through 
both evolution and the specific life of an organism (Bernard, 1957 p. 93). This is not a re-
introduction of vital forces, for although complex, organisms are nothing more than 
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physiochemical properties. It is the organization of living organisms makes them 
qualitatively different from the non-living.  
Complexity makes analysis difficult. Even simple deductions are uncertain. The 
experimental analysis aims at disassociating these phenomena in order to reduce them to 
simpler relations. But despite this there is always insufficiency in an experimental setup. The 
experimenter is dependent on a good experimental setup in order to do adequate tests. 
Indeed, it is the skill of the trained experimenter to design and perform good experimental 
setups. For this, the laboratory is a necessary condition. It is a place for withdrawal, where 
the experimenter can analyze phenomena in a setting disentangled from their complex 
context.  
According to Bernard, the skill of experimental physiology is only learned in laboratories. I 
interpret this as an emphasis on experimental medicine as craftsmanship, where the practical 
factors of experimental performance are necessary for an adequate outcome. The material 
analysis of Bernard has been a tremendous success, leading from physiology to cell biology, 
and further on to the molecular biology of the 20th century. In establishing a method and 
approach to study life, Bernard also established a certain view of life: the physiochemical. 
Although Bernard states the importance of totality and organization in organisms, his 
experimental method is an approach that mostly produces knowledge of the constituents of 
biological phenomena. The view of Bernard that the cause of biological phenomena is found 
in underlying physiochemical processes has had a large influence on medicine. These are 
some of the aspects of the work of Bernard that were problematized by Georges Canguilhem 
and will be more thoroughly handled in part 4. 
1.2 Situatedness	  and	  subjectivity	  of	  scientific	  activity.	  	  
Until 1950s theories inspired by positivism (logical positivism) were the leading philosophy 
of science in the English-speaking world. Today its influence persists. Stephen Hawking 
wrote recently:  
"Any sound scientific theory, whether of time or of any other concept, should in my opinion be based 
on the most workable philosophy of science: the positivist approach put forward by Karl Popper and 
others. According to this way of thinking, a scientific theory is a mathematical model that describes 
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and codifies the observations we make. A good theory will describe a large range of phenomena on 
the basis of a few simple postulates and will make definite predictions that can be tested… If one 
takes the positivist position, as I do, one cannot say what time actually is. All one can do is describe 
what has been found to be a very good mathematical model for time and say what predictions it 
makes." (Hawking, 2001 p31)   
But from the middle of the last century there was an increasing interest in looking at science 
as a historical and social activity. Several lines of thought, both from scientists and 
philosophers in Anglo-American and French philosophy, addressed the situated aspects of 
scientific knowledge production.  
1.2.1 Subjectivity	  and	  incommensurability.	  	  
One of the earliest works describing the situatedness of knowledge production was Ludwig 
Fleck’s "The Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact" (Fleck, 1976)7. The first 
English translation of this book was published in 1976, then with a foreword of Thomas 
Kuhn. A central notion in the work of Fleck was the thought collective; knowledge was 
produced in a social environment through a specific "thought style". Thus, the knowledge 
was not only a product of rational and logical investigations of the world, but also of the 
social process in the scientific community.	  
Another early book that criticizes the positivist position of science is “Science, Faith and 
Society" (1946), by Michael Polanyi (Polanyi, 1964).  He argues that positivism fails to 
recognize the role that subjectivity plays in the practice of science. Later Polanyi developed 
the concept of tacit component of science (Polanyi, 1958). According to Polanyi, there 
scientific knowledge depends to a large extent on the idiosyncratic and practical 
craftsmanship of scientific investigation. Through a subjective process the scientist goes into 
the theoretical-practical situation that constitutes a scientific work. Through investing time 
and effort in a field, and embodying skills through tacit knowledge, the scientist gets 
committed to the area of study. This commitment makes it possible to further pursue 
interesting problems and creating a focus that is needed to resolve complex problems, but 
also creating a way of thinking, a “personal knowledge”. Thus, for Polanyi, scientific 
knowledge is decentralized and, at least partly, discontinuous. A branch of science can in 
                                                
7 Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache. Einführung in die Lehre vom Denkstil und Denkkollektiv 
Schwabe und Co., Verlagsbuchhandlung, Basel, 1935. 
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this way develop a framework for conducting and understanding science that is 
incommensurable with respect to other branches.  
The landmark event in the debate of philosophy of science in the English-speaking world 
was the notion of paradigm shifts, as developed by Thomas Kuhn, widely used far beyond 
philosophical circles. In his work from 1962, "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" 
(Kuhn, 1996) Kuhn attacks the view of the positivists that science is a rational activity. Kuhn 
draws upon both Polanyi's description of the idiosyncratic and practical aspects of science, 
as well as Ludwik Fleck's notion of "thought collectives" that maintain certain thought styles 
(Fleck, 1976). If one studies the history of science, said Kuhn, one will find periods of 
developed science followed by breaks with the established scientific paradigm, and a 
development of a new scientific understanding that is incommensurable with the previous 
understanding. Science has throughout history existed as different paradigms, with different 
presuppositions, values, problems, and methods.  
1.2.2 Historical	  epistemology	  in	  French	  philosophy.	  	  
In the first half of last century, an autonomous reflection on sciences was developed in 
France; it originated from a critical reflection on science's historical development.   
Schematically, this position can be summarized in this way: since the philosophy of science 
is a reflection on theoretical and experimental procedures of science, it must take as its 
starting point the history of science. (de Cuzzani, 2003 p. 61) Therefore, thirty years before 
Kuhn, Gaston Bachelard thematized the historical and situated characteristics of science in a 
series of books, including "Le nouvel esprit scientifique" (1934; English translation, 1984) 
and "La philosophie du non" (1940; English translation, 1964), (Bachelard, 2006; Bachelard, 
1988). 
Bachelards work was structured as case studies of concrete scientific situations, where 
knowledge of both scientific detail and historical and philosophical theory played equally 
important roles. Bachelard claimed that science was a rational activity, but using case studies 
he showed how there was different local scientific rationalities within different fields, or 
even within one field at different times. He pointed at the discontinuities in scientific history: 
science is not a steady process of increase in knowledge. For science to progress there must 
be epistemological breaks where new scientific understandings break with the logic and 
presuppositions of the previous understanding. The philosopher of science must go into 
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detail in specific scientific cases in order to give an adequate philosophical account of 
science (Rheinberger, 2005).  
Bachelard also emphasized the role of technology in the scientific work. Instrumentation 
used in experiments is the result of previous scientific work, and therefore theories are 
embodied into technological devices. Instruments are theories materialized, and new 
scientific findings are given concrete reality in a “technique of realization” in what 
Bachelard called phenomenotechnique. As scientific theories are materialized in the 
apparatus of scientific enquiry, theory testing cannot be separated from theory. Rather, the 
scientist uses technology to invent phenomena. Thus, technology is not a by-product of 
scientific activity, but the theoretical-material part of the matrix of understanding that 
enables the production of new material-theoretical phenomena. Technology is used unite 
theoretical conceptions of material phenomena and the matter of interest. This enables the 
scientist to manipulate the matter so to produce or construct new phenomena (Rheinberger, 
2005). Rather than revealing truths about nature, scientist create their own objects, and these 
objects gain their meaning only within the understanding and approach of the particular 
science (Castelão-Lawless, 1995). 
George Canguilhem in the wake of Bachelard, developed a epistemological history of 
science (Lecourt, 1975 p. 163). According to Canguilhem the task of the philosopher of 
science is to try to reconstruct the sciences according to each science own history. 
Canguilhem argues that the history of science is a particular form of history, because its 
subject is a special kind of object: the historicity of the scientific problems (de Cuzzani, 
2003 p. 83).	  The fact that the scientific problems are historical, involves that they cannot be 
conceived independent of the historical research process. An important insight for this is that 
there is a relationship between the conception of the world that is established by the science, 
and the approach that is used by the scientists to study the world. The task of philosophy of 
science consists in discovering and analyzing the problems posed or evaded, resolved or 
dissolved by the actual practice of scientists. To accomplish this task Canguilhem proposes 
an epistemological investigation of the historicity of the production of scientific concepts. As 
formulated by Lecourt:   
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“It is understandable that Georges Canguilhem should have concentrated his attention on the 
condition of appearance of concepts, i.e., ultimately, on the conditions which make problems 
formulatable.” (Lecourt, 1975 p.173)  
Concepts permit to formulate scientific questions and theories represents the scientific 
answers. Moreover, Canguilhem argues that one and the same concept can take place in 
different theories (Gutting, 2001 p. 229).   
Michel Foucault (1926-1984) inspired by both Bachelard and Canguilhem (Gutting, 2001) p. 
86) developed Bachelard's notion of epistemological breaks into a project of showing that 
concepts and practices that present themselves as a-historical necessities are historical and 
contingent. Foucault described this project as an effort to discover the unconsciousness of 
our knowledge, and also to see how breaks with the established discourses could take place 
at particular times and places (Gutting, 2001 pp. 258-288).  
It was important for Bachelard, Canguilhem, and Foucault to study the historical and social 
conditions for knowledge production. Foucault calls the works of Bachelard and Canguilhem 
historical epistemology (Utaker, 2009). In a culture there will be certain views of what type 
of knowledge is important and how this knowledge should be obtained or produced. This 
will constitute what types of questions are asked at a given times, and what practices which 
are developed to meet these questions. Investigating concrete cases of scientific activity and 
how this activity was constituted at a given place at a given time would both show both how 
the activity emerged, was sustained, and also how it decreased or was replaced at a later 
time.  
Foucault investigated the conditions of knowledge production. In a Kantian line, Foucault 
claims that there are forms that make possible the production of certain types of knowledge. 
For Kant these forms are a priori universal, and they determine the validity of statements; 
for Foucault they are a priori relative to that which is conditioned. Foucault here sets up two 
types of conditions for the production of a statement: the existence conditions, that make it 
possible for a statement to be formulated at all, and the validity conditions that determine 
whether the statement is true or false (Utaker, 2009). Indeed, both Bachelard and also 
Canguilhem show that the forms of knowledge production are relative, and to point at how 
the existence conditions and validity conditions are established, exercised, and changed. 
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1.3 Understanding	  experimental	  molecular	  medicine	  as	  a	  hybrid	  activity.	  
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s a wave of thinkers elaborated on the historical and situated 
aspects of science. Several of these drew upon anthropology and sociology for understanding 
science itself and the role that it plays in western culture. This led to a commonly held 
social-constructivist view of science: where the positivists had stated that science dealt with 
a-historical necessities, the social-constructivist view questioned whether anything in science 
could be explained by reference to necessities in the material world (Lübcke, 2003 p. 267). 
An example of such works is "Laboratory Life" by Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar. 
Bruno Latour’s philosophical development is also characteristic for a trend in this tradition 
of philosophy of science. From the social constructivist position in his early works, he later 
tries to see how material agency plays a part in the both social and material activity of 
scientific practice (Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Latour, 1993). Other thinkers that have 
thematized the role of material agency in the social, technological and situated scientific 
process is Ian Hacking, Hans-Jörg Rheinberger and Andrew Pickering (Hacking, 1983).  
In his work "The Mangling of Practice - Time, Agency, and Science" (Pickering, 1997) 
Pickering tried to give an account of the interplay between scientific practice and material 
agency. Pickering picks up a thread from Bachelard, who claimed that material agency 
revealed itself through resistances. Pickering describes the experimental process as a process 
of accommodation, resistance, and tuning: the scientist has a hypothesis, an anticipation or 
an idea that he/she wants to investigate. An experimental setup is made to arrange the 
material agency in such a way that it can give information about this hypothesis, idea or 
anticipation. If no sense can be made out of the activity of the material agency, the scientist 
has encountered a resistance stemming from a shortcoming in the understanding of the 
matter. From this the scientist has to evaluate and change his/hers understanding, tune the 
experimental setup, and try a new accommodation. This process is repeated until the scientist 
is able to obtain meaningful information from the material. 
I will in the rest of this section discuss the role of social, technological, and rhetorical factors 
in the concrete research process of experimental molecular medicine. I will do this through a 
presentation of the work "Laboratory Life - The Construction of Scientific Facts" by Steve 
Woolgar and Bruno Latour (Latour & Woolgar, 1986), before I give a closer look at the 
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experimental system as a system of knowledge production through a presentation of Hans-
Jörg Rheinbergers work "Towards a History of Epistemic Things - Synthesizing Proteins in 
the Test Tube" (Rheinberger, 1997).   
1.3.1 Laboratory	  Life:	  an	  anthropologist	  visits	  the	  laboratory.	  
When Laboratory Life was published in 1979 it was one of the first anthropological works 
studying science as a cultural activity. The work was a case study of the laboratory of Roger 
Guillemin, later a Nobel laureate in medicine, at the Salk Institute in LaJolla, California. The 
background for the study was the impression that western anthropology had detailed 
knowledge about other cultures, but that central activities within our own civilization had not 
been studied with the same methods (Latour & Woolgar, 1986 p. 17). One had separated 
science from the social, as if science was naturally and rationally given. There had been few 
efforts to investigate the methods and activities that lead to the production of knowledge as 
cultural phenomena.  
One of the problems of studying one's own culture is that that it is easy to unknowingly 
accept the premises of the activity, and in that way masking some of the constituting cultural 
factors of the activity. To protect the cultural perspective Latour & Woolgar decided to not 
accept that natural science was about the truth. They rather took an outside perspective, 
seeing science as a purely social activity that could be studied in the same way as other 
social activities. In this way they could avoid that the “truth” could trump any analysis of 
choice, relations, and decisions (Latour & Woolgar, 1986 p.29).  
One of the main questions that is investigated in is Laboratory Life is: how does a process 
dependent on certain people handling a certain type of instruments at a certain place in a 
certain time in history, end up producing statements that are supposed to be eternal facts 
about the world? How do such particular social situations and processes produce eternal pure 
facts? To understand this Latour & Woolgar started by giving a naïve description of the 
practical laboratory activity (Latour & Woolgar, 1986 p. 45). The people in the laboratory 
are doing craftsmanship, treating material, reagents, and machines in regulated practices and 
configurations. The output of the process comes in the form of inscriptions (graphs, 
diagrams etc.) made by the machines. These inscriptions are then interpreted as a direct 
indication of the substance that is studied, and taken as evidence for or against certain ideas, 
concepts, or theories. From the interpretations of these first inscriptions new inscriptions are 
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made. These are called scientific papers, and include both graphical and written inscriptions. 
In the scientific paper the scientists make claims about how nature is. The participants of the 
laboratory view the production of scientific papers the main goal of their activity. Thus the 
laboratory can be seen as a place for literary inscription. 
The phenomena that are manifested through the inscriptions are made possible by a certain 
material configuration, in the form of experimental setup and a specific sequence of events, 
as made possible by the experimenter. This, says Latour & Woolgar, is what Bachelard calls 
phenomenotechnique: the manifestation of phenomena by their construction through 
material techniques (Latour & Woolgar, 1986 p. 63). An important aspect of the 
phenomenotechnique is that the material setups used for creating new phenomena 
themselves contain theories and assumptions. A model system or a machine used for 
analysis has also been the subject of scientific debate. The inherent theoretical understanding 
of the material setup is what forms a "matrix of understanding" of the material under study, 
in which new phenomena can be understood and given meaning. The strength of the 
laboratory is exactly that it contains the specific configuration of technology and knowledge 
designed for the purpose of bringing forth specific material phenomena in such a matrix of 
understanding. The laboratory allows for analysis and making distinctions, for the choice of 
one statement over another. The laboratory thus forms a reality that does not have its 
counterpart in the world outside the laboratory, but is specifically situated in the laboratory. 
An important point Latour & Woolgar make here is that the relation between statements and 
facts are inverted in the laboratory culture. The scientists in the case study view the 
experimental work as a process of revealing the truth about nature. Once the truth has been 
revealed, the way it was revealed is uninteresting. As the theories and assumptions contained 
in the experimental setup often are well established and agreed-upon, they are seen as true 
descriptions of the world, and therefore not questioned. The experimental result coming out 
from the manipulation of the experimental setup can then also be seen as a direct and true 
description of the substance that is studied. Latour & Woolgar, on the other hand, claim that 
the truth is a consequence rather than the foundation of laboratory work (Latour & Woolgar, 
1986 p. 183). The truth is a part of the social process. The image we have of the world is a 
result of the science that we use to say something about the world. In this perspective, the 
way such an image is produced becomes an integral part of the understanding we have of the 
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world. It is no longer possible to view facts as eternal and pure statements of the world. They 
are entangled in human activity. 
This further emphasizes the importance of looking at the concrete fact-producing processes, 
both the material and intellectual. Latour & Woolgar find that the thought processes of the 
scientists in the laboratory do not differ from those that are found in daily life. They 
conclude that there is no specific scientific rationality, and that rather, scientists seem 
scientific because they are scientists.  A scientific discussion is usually a mixture of different 
aspects and interests. This can be due to that that the theoretical, descriptive and technical 
are closely interwoven in the laboratory setting. Indeed, it is in this theoretical-material 
landscape that scientists think, plan, and navigate. Here, Latour & Woolgar follow 
Heidegger in that "gedanke ist Handwerk" (Latour & Woolgar, 1986 p. 171). 
In order to get pure facts about nature from this process, there must be a work of purification 
where the "dirty" hybrid nature of the laboratory that produces the statements is washed off. 
Latour & Woolgar ascribe this purification both to the inversion between statements and 
facts, as was described above, and to the rhetorical aspect of the research process. The 
research process, they claim, can be viewed as a stepwise rhetorical process of justification 
of statements. The functional intention of the literary inscriptions produced by the scientists 
is to produce statements, and to persuade the reader that the statements are true. Important 
parts of the argument are the figures and tables that represent experimental results. When 
there are no more reasons to doubt the statements put forward in the text, it is said to “be 
about facts”. "Laboratory Life" identifies five types of statements in literary inscriptions 
(Latour & Woolgar, 1986 p. 65):  
Type 5: Taken-for-given facts. 
Type 4: Accepted knowledge.  
Type 3: Statements about other statements, where modalities are included  
Type 2: Statements and suggestions derived from more accepted knowledge. 
Type 1: Speculations. 
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In the rhetorical process of showing something as true, the scientists attempt to transform 
statements from lower to higher types. In order to go to a higher type the scientist must 
connect the statement both to earlier statements and to, most importantly, trustworthy 
experimental inscriptions. In this process of transformation the facts lose their social, 
technological, and historical references. From being one plausible alternative among other 
plausible alternatives, statements go through an ontological change and acquire fact status. 
The other alternatives are rendered false. The fact stands alone as a true and pure statement 
about nature.  
When choosing one fact among alternative statements the scientists also face the danger that 
the fact they chose should be found to be an “artifact”. That is, that they cannot argue in a 
convincing manner that their statement is a fact. When a fact is “de-masked” as an artifact, a 
process of deconstruction steps in. All of the technical and social processes leading up to the 
fact become visible as reasons for this fact being wrongly chosen. 
To summarize, "Laboratory Life" describes the laboratory as a place for the construction of 
facts through a practical-theoretical configuration that allows for ordering experience and 
choosing between different statements about the world. The relation between the world and 
the fact is inverted so that the fact is viewed as deducted from true nature itself, while for 
Latour & Woolgar "true nature" is rather a product of the scientific activity. The inversion 
makes it possible for the scientists to remove the fact from the situated context of its 
production through a rhetorical process of argumentation. This is done both by experiments 
and by connecting it to previous knowledge within the field.  
An interesting question that "Laboratory Life" ask, but leaves unanswered, is why the 
illusion of the fact as purely objective is upheld? Indeed, it is not enough to show that 
something is an illusion. One must also show why this illusion is necessary (Kant, 1998) in 
(Latour & Woolgar, 1986 p. 175).   
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1.3.2 Hans-­‐Jörg	  Rheinberger:	  the	  phenomenotechnique	  of	  experimental	  molecular	  
medicine.	  
In his work “Towards a History of Epistemic Things – Synthesizing Proteins in the Test 
Tube” (Rheinberger, 1997) Hans-Jörg Rheinberger looks more closely on experimental 
systems, and on how novel objects come into existence in such systems. Rheinberger uses 
the work of the medical doctor and biochemist Paul Zamecnik as a case for describing how 
experimental systems are used to produce and describe novel objects. Zamecnik and his co-
workers are known for the identification and description of the key constituents and 
mechanisms of protein synthesis during the late 1940s and the 1950s. An important point for 
Rheinberger, which we also have seen for Latour & Woolgar, is that knowledge production 
is situated at a certain time and place. But where "Laboratory Life" from this highlighted the 
social and cultural aspect of scientific work Rheinberger emphasizes the historical and 
technological aspect of scientific work.  
Rheinberger lean on the notion of Bachelard of phenomenotechnique: technologies embody 
scientific concepts. In his investigations of the experimental work of Zamenick he describes 
the experimental system as a matrix of understanding which both has a theoretical and a 
material part (Rheinberger, 1997 p. 29). The technological entities harbor scientific concepts 
that make it possible to think within the material system: how the various technological 
constituents will relate to and react to various scientific phenomena of interest. Importantly, 
the experimental logic of the system, the knowledge to produce fecund and interpretable 
experimental setups, to perform them, and to interpret and judge them, is dependent on the 
practical-theoretical and tacit skill of the experimenter. This connects the theoretical and the 
material part of the previous knowledge within the fieldto the object of study and the 
concrete material situation of designing and performing the experiment. As new epistemic 
things are created in this system, they contain within them the concepts of their production. 
They are phenomenotechical.  
The technical conditions of the experimental system determine the realm of possible 
representations of epistemic things. The more the experimenter learns to think within the 
system through a practical rationality, the better the system comes to realize its intrinsic 
capacities. But also, as the system is designed to capture the unknown and unforeseen, it 
harbors within it more capacities then the researcher knows. Through this, new spaces of 
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experience and new kinds of rationalities are created, where the system both is a space for 
representation, and a materialization of concepts and theories.  
Rheinberger characterizes the field of scientific knowledge as a field where what is known 
and what is beyond imagination is permanently reoriented and reshuffled (Rheinberger, 1997 
p.11). Rheinberger calls the objects of science, which are produced experimentally and 
implemented in the system, "epistemic things". Every new epistemic thing that is created in 
the system is a result of the knowledge already established in the system. At the same time 
the new entities will lead to new understandings of the previous knowledge. New 
information or understanding about a phenomenon or a context of phenomena will substitute 
the old understanding. Rheinberger calls this a Derridaean principle of supplementarity: a 
process of epistemic displacement where everything is intended as a substitution or addition 
that will reconfigure the system.  
Rheinberger follows Bernard in that experimental knowledge is relational. What one tries to 
register in the experimental system are specific differences. Through defining a field where 
differences can be registered, the experimental system gradually acquires contours, creates 
resonance between different representations, and conveys manageable meanings. An 
experimental system that is organized such that the production of differences becomes the 
orienting principle creates a subversive movement in the sense of a dislocation of epistemic 
entities. The experimental system oscillates from processes of stabilization and subversion: 
phases of representation of new resonances and organizing entities, and phases of confirming 
and stabilizing demonstration (Rheinberger, 1997 p. 80). In this way, a continuous process of 
deconstruction and re-signification upholds the fecundity of an experimental system. New 
traits and entities are included in the system, and the system changes organization to include 
the new traits. As long as the system is capable of producing distinctions, specific 
differences, it will move on.  
The experimental systems are arrangements that allow for the production of cognitive, 
unprecedented, spatiotemporal singularities and events. For this reason, the system cannot be 
to rigidly defined. A rigid system would not be able to produce unforeseen events, while if 
the system is too open, the experimenter cannot make sense of the data registered in the 
system. This experimental openness is also reflected in a theoretical indeterminacy: as the 
scientist cannot to rigidly anticipate the unknown he/she must be sensitive to unforeseen 
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signals from the experimental system (Rheinberger, 1997 p. 14). It is not theory on one hand 
and practice on the other hand. “Deriving” ideas from the material of observation, and 
“imposing” ideas upon the material represented is in this process inextricably connected. In 
this both material and theoretical situation the experimenter aims at achieving resonances in 
the matter of study.  
This notion of resonance points at some element that can be stabilized - something giving 
resonance. This is the epistemic thing. Rheinberger is careful not to assess a positive value to 
the epistemic resonances. Even though talking about resonance of things, he avoids 
describing them as “truth” or “reality" in a positive fashion. The reality of epistemic things 
lies in their resistance, their capacity to turn around the preconceived anticipation and 
understanding. Rheinberger here follows Bachelard and Pickering in that the world shows 
itself through its resistances. Also Michael Polanyi has taken a similar position. Polayni 
proposed that it is the capacity of things to reveal themselves in unexpected ways that shows 
that they are an aspect of reality. To trust a thing that we know is real is also to admit that we 
cannot fully describe it by our conception of it, and that it therefore always will continue to 
manifest itself in new ways in the future (Polanyi, 1965) quoted in (Rheinberger, 1997 p. 
23). The reality of the epistemic things lies in this capacity to turn around our previous 
understanding. The resonance or resistance does not need not to be absolute or eternal. It is 
enough that it can carry the system to some new step.  
Science aims at creating new spaces of representation - at increasing the limits of experience. 
Biological macromolecules cannot be registered by our senses directly. We obtain 
knowledge about them through the traces they leave in the spaces of representation, for 
example as the measurement of radioactive signal from a radioactively labeled protein. Such 
material traces, or representations, Rheinberger calls graphemes. Rheinberger here draws on 
Van Fraassen and Sigmand:  
“Representation of an object involves producing another object which is intentionally related to the 
first by a certain coding convention which determines what counts as similar in the right way” (Van 
Fraassen & Sigman, 1993) quoted in (Rheinberger, 1997 p. 103). 
Thus, when something is represented within the experimental system, this representation is 
also dependent on a conception of how the representation works. This conception is 
governed by the understanding of the experimental system itself. Resulting from this, 
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scientific activity is an endless production of traces, constantly searching for resonances that 
again change the previous understanding in a process of stabilization and subversion. The 
references for such a system of endless production of are neither things in themselves nor 
social constructions or paradigms, but rather internal referents consisting of previous 
knowledge and theories and of other experimental systems. There is not a dichotomy 
between representation and reality. The experimental system is itself a product of such a 
process of representation. The measurement of radioactivity through a Geiger teller is itself a 
product of the representation of entities within particle physics. Rheinberger can here be 
understood as making an immanent ontology, where he starts out by saying that entities are 
represented through traces in spaces of representation. Ending up by saying that there is 
nothing but traces and representations and how they relate to each other (Rheinberger, 1997 
p. 104).  
1.3.3 The	  laboratory	  as	  producer	  of	  knowledge.	  
In their works presented here, Latour & Woolgar and Rheinberger describe the processes 
where knowledge is produced in the laboratory. But they manage to show how cultural and 
social aspects of experimental molecular medicine affect the knowledge production: how 
facts are produced from an internal logic of sign-systems, various experimental inscriptions, 
negotiations, and rhetoric processes. Latour & Woolgar talks about the processes through 
which decisions are made, and through which a fact is established, which they call micro-
processes. But they do not clarify why exactly one explanation is chosen before another. On 
this point both Latour and Rheinberger have a quite near-sighted view: something is 
important because it adds to the fecundity of the system. Maybe the main factor determining 
the importance of experimentally produced facts are what Latour addresses in his later work 
"The Pasteurisation of France" (Latour, 1988), namely that they can be translated out of the 
laboratory and into a setting of for example the clinic. The value of new epistemic entities 
will be evaluated with respect to some means outside of the experimental system itself.  
I would emphasize the importance of the factors robustness and relevance in the knowledge 
production. Choosing a statement about the subject of study needs to be robust and 
trustworthy. Thus, trustworthiness will be of importance, for example as described in 
Laboratory Life where the trustworthiness of a fact was based on the experimental setup. 
With respect to relevance, the statement claims to have some sort of relevance outside itself, 
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it claims to be part of a context, wide or narrow. Thus it claims some sort of continuum in 
causality, identification, representation or similarity to a context outside itself. Thus, for a 
statement to be made, one needs to have some basis for robustness and relevance. 
The premise and strength of the laboratory is that it is a place of simplifying and modeling 
life. To be able to single out causalities, there is a trade-off between durability and relevance 
of statements. We here touch upon the problem of generality of biological statements, as 
have been addressed by both Bernard and Canguilhem: due to the complexity of biological 
systems, one cannot assess a generality to statements without producing new statements that 
are as equally well durable about that particular case in that particular context. One cannot 
transfer statements and judgments from one model system to another without a new process 
of validation in the new context. Still, the laboratory approach has led to numerous clinical 
applications, thus there is a work of what Latour would call translation (Latour, 1988) 
translating the knowledge from the laboratory into the clinic. What is the basis of relevance 
for experimentally produced knowledge? The shortcoming with Rheinberger lies in the 
relevance: he concentrates on how knowledge is produced in its concrete setting, and he also 
gives account for how it is stabilized and made durable within the experimental systems. But 
he does not account for how this stabilized entity is translated into knowledge that can be 
used outside the laboratory. 
1.4 Summing	  up	  and	  approaching.	  
The two lines of thought presented here are both central for understanding science as it is 
conducted today. The early positivists were important for establishing medicine as a 
scientific discipline, and the positivists tried to create a rational and systematic foundation 
for the sciences. The natural sciences bear with them a positivistic ambition of a systematic 
and rational description of the natural world. This ambition can take the form of a belief that 
science is a direct, rational, logical and systematic representation or description of the natural 
world, or it can take the more moderate form of an ambition to make a systematic and 
internally coherent understanding of the object of study.  
The historical epistemology of Bachelard and Canguilhem showed the importance of going 
into detail in the practical scientific work in order to show how scientific rationalities vary 
with time, place, and situation. In the light of this view the positivistic approach becomes 
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problematic. Also, Bachelard emphasized how the scientific knowledge production takes 
place in a theoretical-material field of phenomenotechnique. Michel Polanyi further 
described how this local scientific activity has a large individual and tacit component. Later 
sociologists and philosophers of science, such as Bruno Latour and Andrew Pickering, have 
further tried to work out the relationship between the social enterprises that are the sciences, 
and their objects of study in the material world.  
In the works of Bernard, Latour & Woolgar, and Rheinberger we have seen several 
important factors that play a part in the experimental molecular medicine. The problems that 
are investigated are somehow connected to human health, and they are investigated 
experimentally at the molecular level of the organism. The challenge of experimental 
molecular medicine is to draw sound conclusions from the complexity of the object of study. 
This is handled through a thoroughly elaborated experimental system of material analysis. 
Through the experimental setup, where meaning is given to new phenomena through an 
internal system of referents, the scientist intervenes with the matter of study, and in response 
he/she meets resistances or resonances. Through a process of accommodation, resistances 
are sought overcome, and through a process of stabilization, resonances are sought stabilized 
and further connected to the system of referents, and in the end purified as statements about 
the material world. As a result of the new knowledge, the system of referents will re-
organize to include the new entity in the network.  
Along the way in this process, decisions and evaluations are continuously made. These are 
dependent on both the quality and outcome of the experiments, but also on the evaluation of 
the experiments with relation to the system of referents, both technical and theoretical. The 
fact-production process is to a large extent singular and situated: there is not a general 
approach for making an experiment work. This does not necessarily mean that the 
knowledge is singular and situated, but that in the process of mangling one does not know in 
advance under which circumstances one can achieve resonance. As Rheinberger notes, this 
situation of fumbling is a characteristic of the research process. This fluidity implies 
however, that there is a process of translation and justification required to show that the 
epistemic things and the knowledge-claims about them are relevant also outside the 
laboratory. This has been called the in vivo-in vitro problem (Strand, 2003). 
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The processes of formulating medical problems, constructing an experimental setup for 
solving them, conducting and evaluating experiments, stabilize and formulate findings, and 
translate findings to a relevant solution of the problem are gathered in a theoretical-practical 
process. I will take my enquiry of knowledge production in experimental molecular 
medicine along the lines of historical epistemology. Rather than to address scientific 
knowledge production in a general manner, it is indeed necessary to specify the scientific 
tradition of interest. Medicine has its own history of establishing itself as a science. 
Molecular medicine both has its own methodological and theoretical history and its 
implication on what life and disease is, and the experimental methodology brings with it 
important phenomenotechnological considerations. The knowledge production must be 
understood as both social, material, technological, value-laden, and practical.  
In the positions handled above I have not been able to find a satisfactory take on the, to 
borrow an expression from Latour (Latour, 1993), hybrid aspects of experimental molecular 
medicine. Bernard establishes the experimental method, but he does not seem to recognize, 
as noted by Canguilhem, that this method also represent a certain perspective on life. 
Rheinberger addresses the internal dynamics of fact production, while Latour & Woolgar 
present some of the cultural dynamics surrounding the process. In order to get an integrated 
understanding of experimental molecular medicine these concepts and notions have to be 
developed into an understanding that is theoretical, practical, material, and value-laden. It is 
this that I will try to develop in the rest of this work. What perspective on life determines the 
experimental method as approach, and the molecular level as a meaningful level for medical 
investigations? How is the experimental work governed and conducted in order to produce 
knowledge relevant for human health, and how does the resulting knowledge live up to the 
aims of the science? 
Bearing Bernard's words in mind, we should try to avoid becoming false men, not only of 
science, but also of philosophy of science. As I have emphasized the singularity of 
experimental research, we will now turn to this game of hide-and-seek between human and 
material agency: we will go to the laboratory8.  
 
                                                
8 Import to add: we will also go to the office next to the laboratory, where projects are planned and articles read. 
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2. Case study: The NAT-group. 
I will now go on to look at a concrete case, namely the NAT/Thyroid research group (from 
here on termed the NAT-group) at the Department of Molecular Biology and the Department 
of Surgical Sciences at the University of Bergen (UiB), Norway. I am myself a researcher at 
this group, where I have taken both a master’s degree and a PhD-degree9.  
I will first give a short general introduction to the NAT-group's history and context, before I 
proceed to investigate a specific project within the group, namely the identification and 
characterization of the human protein N-α-acetyltransferase complex C (hNatC). My focus 
will be on the individual and practical aspect of the research process.  
2.1 The	  context	  of	  NAT	  resarch.	  
2.1.1 A	  short	  history	  of	  the	  NAT-­‐group.	  
Johan Lillehaug, professor in molecular biology at University of Bergen, and Jan Erik 
Varhaug, specialist in endocrine surgery at Haukeland University Hospital and professor at 
Department of Surgical Sciences, initiated the Thyroid-group as an effort to identify genes 
and/or gene products involved in the development of thyroid tumors. Such genes and gene 
products could then further be described with respect to treatment of thyroid cancer. The 
method used was to remove thyroid cancer tumors from patients by surgery, and 
subsequently analyze them using molecular biology tools in the laboratory. In the analysis 
they looked for genes that were higher or lower expressed in the thyroid tumors, as 
compared to normal thyroid tissue from the same patient. Among several genes found up- or 
down-regulated, three were found particularly interesting and chosen for further 
characterization. One of these was the N-α-acetyltransferase human (NATH) (Fluge et al., 
2002). 
The NATH gene was found over expressed in thyroid carcinomas. The gene encoded the 
NATH protein, a protein previously un-described in humans. Works on the yeast homologue 
of NATH, Nat1, had showed that the protein was part of an enzymatic complex named the 
                                                
9 Professor Johan R. Lillehaug and Dr. Thomas Arnesen have read, commented on, and approved the case description as it 
is given here. 
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NatA complex (protein N-α-acetyltransferase complex A). This complex catalyzed the 
chemical protein modification N-α-acetylation (Polevoda & Sherman, 2003). Protein 
modifications are considered crucial in regulating the biological function of proteins. N-α-
acetylation was one of the most common protein modifications in eukaryotic organisms, but 
besides this not much was known about this particular modification. So NATH seemed to be 
a protein with a large potential for novel and interesting findings. On the basis of this, 
Varhaug and Lillehaug applied for funding of a PhD-position at the Norwegian Cancer 
Society to further investigate the NATH gene and protein10. 
The stipend was given to Thomas Arnesen. Arnesen described NATH as a part of the human 
NatA complex (hNatA) (Arnesen et al., 2005). Also, projects were initiated to identify other 
protein N-α-acetyltransferases (NATs) in humans, independent of Thyroid cancer. The work 
on N-α-acetyltransferases shifted from studying the role of NATH in thyroid cancer, to a 
more general characterization of protein N-α-acetylation and the proteins that catalyzed this 
reaction.  
With Arnesen the project started growing in manpower, including technical apprentices, 
technicians, master students, and PhD-students. I myself started as a master student at the 
group in 2005. In 2006 Arnesen himself continued as a post-doctor at the group. In addition 
two PhD-students at the group and several master students worked on the project. This 
enabled both the initiation of several and more ambitious projects, and the build-up of 
specialized methodological expertise within the group.  
The following years, from 2006 to 2009, the group continued to build momentum. It 
expanding its international network through arranging meetings for groups involved in the 
field of protein N-α-terminal acetylation and developing cooperation with these groups 
(Arnesen, 2009)(Arnesen et al., 2009), recruiting more PhD-students and master students. It 
produced a series of articles on other proteins in the NAT protein family (Evjenth et al., 
2009; Starheim et al., 2008, 2009).  
From 2010 and onward can be said to mark a new phase for the NAT-work, as Arnesen 
received a grant from the Norwegian Research Council for the establishment of an 
                                                
10 In total, three PhD-projects were initiated on the basis of gene candidates from the work of Fluge, each addressing one 
candidate gene. NATH was one of these three. 
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independent research group. While the first period (late 1980's to 2000) was a period for 
developing a topic of study and a project profile, the second period was a period where 
several independent projects lived side by side (2001-2005/6). In the third period the NAT-
project continued and the NAT-group expanded and developed momentum (2006-2009), the 
fourth and present period can be said to mark the start of a period where the phase will try to 
define itself as a larger research-group with a certain ambition level. This is both marked by 
an increase in the number of PhD-students and post-docs in the group, and a change in 
research group organization, with the NAT-group being an independent research group of 
Arnesen, separated from the research group of Lillehaug (spring 2010).  
2.1.2 The	  medical	  perspective	  of	  NAT-­‐research.	  
The NAT-group is situated at the Department of Molecular Biology at the Faculty of 
Mathematics and Natural Sciences at the University of Bergen. The Department of Surgery 
has been involved in defining medical problems and supplying the group with clinical 
material in the form of tumor samples. More specifically, the medical discipline connected to 
the NAT-group is oncology or tumor biology. Importantly, although being defined as 
molecular biology as such, the group has a medical perspective11. As we have seen in part 1, 
the distinction between medicine and biology brings some central considerations, and I have 
therefore used the term "molecular medicine" to describe the topic of the group. The medical 
perspective is further emphasized through the funding of the group from institutions such as 
Norwegian Health Region West and The Norwegian Cancer Society.  
The connection to oncology sets a perspective on the work of the group: the relevance of 
biological macromolecules with respect to cancer. Something that is highly relevant for 
oncology is important/valuable/"good", and something that is irrelevant for oncology is 
irrelevant/unvalued/"bad". This again is decisive for what questions we ask, what problems 
we pursue, and what experiments we conduct. It is not the biological macromolecules per se 
that we are studying; it is their involvement in human disease. NATH was chosen because it 
was over expressed in thyroid cancer. Protein N-α-acetylation was further pursued due to 
                                                
11 The Department of Molecular Biology at UiB was started in 1996 at the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, 
and consisted then of a number of group from different departments and faculties that all fell within a definition of 
molecular biology. Lillehaug was then situated at the Faculty of Medicine, UiB, where he had done molecular biology 
research related to Thyroid cancer. According to Lillehaug (personal communication) an important reason for starting a 
department of molecular biology at the faculty of natural sciences was to gain more independence from the medical 
sciences, and thus make possible a more autonomous molecular biology at UiB. 
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both this link to cancer, and to that it was widespread and poorly understood. It had a high 
potential for providing medically relevant findings. 
Such scientific goals are changeable, and evaluations are made with respect to what 
directions the project has a potential. One could say that it is sufficient for the group that the 
findings are relevant for something. Such a change in perspective can be seen in the group as 
it went from clinical oncology to more general molecular biology. But as the group has 
commitments to funding sources and employers (for example Health Region West), such 
changes in focus cannot be done without at the same time arguing for the relevance of such a 
change. And also, a change in focus also often means a change in methodology and 
knowledge, thus one must be sure that this investment is worth it. Following from this, one 
would expect that at least major changes follow a somewhat conservative dynamic. In the 
case of the NAT-group it can be tempting to speculate that the change in focus from 
clinically related thyroid work to more general molecular biology also was connected with 
the development of an independent research group with a new leadership.  
2.2 The	  hNatC	  project	  part	  1:	  Initial	  characterization.	  
Until 2005 the group had worked mostly on the hNatA protein complex. In yeast a NatC 
protein complex had also been described (Polevoda & Sherman, 2001). Arnesen did a search 
on the Entrez Human Genome Database12, where he found that there existed genes for 
predicted human homologues to the three subunits of the yeast NatC complex in the human 
genome. From this prediction he formulated the hypothesis that there also existed a human 
NatC complex (hNatC). The aim of my study as a master student was to identify the subunits 
of the hNatC complex. I also continued work on the hNatC complex into my PhD-work.  
I will here not address every aspect of the hNatC-project. Rather, I will describe some parts 
of the process that are philosophically interesting. As for today (August 2011), the project 
can be divided in three phases where three main questions have been addressed. The first 
question when the project was started was that of identity: what are the constituents of the 
hNatC complex? The second question was that of relevance: "is hNatC important for human 
cells?" The third question, which is the one addressed in the current work of the project, is 
                                                
12 A database predicting all possible translated human proteins from the human genome based on knowledge 
about gene expression and translation of RNA into proteins (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/). 
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that of function: what is the function of hNatC? This latter question will be further addressed 
in 2.3. Here I will look at the questions of identity and relevance, and how they went on to 
form the first hNatC-paper of the group, published in 2009 (Starheim et al., 2009). 
2.2.1 What	  are	  the	  subunits	  of	  hNatC?	  
As mentioned above, Arnesen formulated a hypothesis based on database predictions: there 
existed a human NatC complex. Based on the assumption that the homologues of the yeast 
NatC subunits were the proteins that was most conserved throughout evolution, three 
candidates were chosen, one for each yeast NatC-subunit. In the database they had the names 
NAT12, MAK10, and LSM8. Now, the hypothesis had to be experimentally verified since 
database-predictions are not considered proof for the existence of a complex. 
The task I was given as a master student was to 1) experimentally investigate if these 
predicted human homologues could form a complex, 2) if they were associated with 
ribosomes (as had been shown as an important part of the function in yeast), and 3) if they 
displayed enzymatic activity. If so, we had identified a hNatC complex. This would be a 
finding represented novelty in the human field, and could form the basis for wider 
knowledge of NATs in human. I will here go through the first point: the investigation of 
whether the predicted human homologues formed a complex. A summary of the 
experimental procedure described here is given in figure 2.1. 
While I initiated the work on NAT12, MAK10, and LSM8, a paper was published presenting 
a vertebrate NatC complex (a complex in Zebrafish and rat) (Wenzlau et al., 2006). Using 
these identified NatC subunit proteins as query sequences in the human genome, I obtained 
two different top-candidates for hNatC subunit complexes: NAT5 (a homologue of NAT12), 
and LSMD1 (a homologue of LSM8). This meant that for two of the subunits of hNatC, I 
had two candidates that had to be tested (Figure 2.1). 
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Figure 2.1: Experimental setup for identifying subunits of the hNatC 
complex by immunoprecipitation. 
I used the method immunoprecipitation to investigate which of the candidates interacted to 
form a complex. This experiment was decisive for choosing one alternative over others when 
deciding what should be defined as the subunits of the hNatC complex. The basis for this 
experiment is that one collect cells, typically from an artificially cultured cell culture, crush 
the cells, and then use a probe to pull out a protein x from the cell soup (called a 
homogenate). Proteins that interact with protein x in the soup will then be pulled along with 
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protein x. If one is interested in investigating if protein y is an interaction partner of x, one 
can analyze the pull-down complex with a probe recognizing protein y. If the probe 
recognizes y in the pull-down complex, one can conclude that x and y somehow interacts. 
Importantly, one should also compare with a control-protein z that is not expected to interact 
with x. As for most experimental setups immunoprecipitation contains many factors that 
give rise to modalities. The conditions for crushing cells, the interaction between probe and 
protein, the physiological conditions of the pull-down, and the conditions of analysis of the 
pull-down complex are all factors that need tuning.  
In my case, I was to investigate which of the candidates LSM8, MAK10, NAT12, NAT5, 
and LSMD1 interacted to form a protein complex. Several different setups were tried with 
various results. Some pullouts did not yield any interaction partners at all, and some pullouts 
pulled out all proteins tested, included the negative control protein. Some setups showed 
pullout of various candidates, but they were not always reproducible. It took many rounds of 
tuning before I succeeded to design a setup that showed interactions between MAK10, 
NAT12, and LSMD1, as compared to the negative control. It took further rounds of tuning to 
reproduce the result. In addition to this setup additional alternative setups were needed to 
verify the interactions. On the basis of about 60 experiments over 2 years, we concluded that 
NAT12, MAK10, and LSMD1 were the subunits of the hNatC complex. The proteins were 
re-named after their yeast homologues (e.g. the human homologue of Mak3p is human 
MAK3, termed hMAK3, with the prefix h- indicating species (human)). 
2.2.2 What	  is	  the	  relevance	  of	  hNatC?	  
We had identified a novel human protein complex. But did this complex actually have any 
biological role? We investigated this by removing the proteins in the hNatC complex from 
the cell, and looking at different phenotypes resulting from this depletion. "Phenotype" is 
defined as "the set of observable characteristics of an individual resulting from the 
interaction of its genotype with the environment"13. In molecular medicine this environment 
can often be the internal environment of the organism, and the phenotype is understood as 
how the genes manifest themselves in the organism. One thus looks at the state of the 
organism and on the characteristics of particular processes in the organism. The phenotype 
                                                
13 New Oxford American Dictionary in Apple Dictionary Version 2.1.3, 2005-2009 Apple Inc. 
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experiments were performed by PhD-student Darina Gromyko. She depleted the identified 
hNatC protein subunits in the cell in a process called knockdown, and then used various 
setups to look at various cellular consequences of the depletion. Although she did not 
remove the genes when depleting the hNatC subunits, but only inhibited the expression of 
the genes, the consequences of the depletion are still called a phenotype.  
The number of measurable potential phenotypes of protein depletion of a protein x is 
enormous even on single-cellular level, and they range from general phenotypes such as 
reduced growth and cell death, to small modifications of specific proteins involved in 
particular cellular functions. Which phenotypes one decides to investigate is thus a choice of 
interest. As described above, our group had a cancer perspective, and thus Gromyko 
investigated if cellular processes known to be involved in the development of cancer cells 
were altered after hNatC depletion. Thus, when we found it important to investigate whether 
hNatC had any relevance, we investigated whether the complex had any effect on cancer-
related processes. 
The processes she investigated were cell growth, cell division cycle, and a type of 
programmed cellular death called apoptosis. Her findings were that when hNatC subunits 
were depleted, the cells grew somewhat slower. Cell division was not affected, but there was 
an increase in percentage of cells that had initiated apoptosis. We interpreted these 
phenotypes as signs of hNatC being necessary for the normal well being of the cells in cell 
culture. Apoptosis is considered a way for the organism to regulate the number of cells, and 
remove damaged cells. A hallmark of cancer cells is that they are cells that fail to go into 
apoptosis. Thus, inducing apopotosis in cancer cells is a way to kill cancer cells. Therefore, 
the finding that depletion of hNatC induced apoptosis was interesting for us in a cancer 
perspective: it opened for the possibilities that hNatC either potentially could be inhibited as 
a part of cancer treatment, or that hNatC could be a factor contributing to the resistance of 
going into apoptosis in cancer cells. 
It is a long way from cell culture to clinical application, and even though we proposed a 
possible role for hNatC in cancer development or treatment, this role was highly 
hypothetical. Thus, the relevance of the complex was an interesting cell biology observation 
with respect to the central and important process of apoptosis, and a weak suggestion of a 
link to cancer. 
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2.2.3 Making	  the	  article.	  
"Now", Lillehaug said one day, "we have to start thinking paper". At this time my master 
thesis was just finished. I had identified the three subunits of the hNatC complex, and 
showed that they interacted with each other and with the ribosome. The subunits of our work 
were somewhat different than the ones presented in the previous article on the NatC complex 
in vertebrates. All these factors increased the novelty of the study - we had something. It 
could become a good piece of work! So, what did we need to do to make the story good?  
When we started to formulate the article, we also started to formulate which experiments 
were needed for getting the work published at a certain journal-level. The presentation of a 
novel enzymatic complex was novel, but in itself not that interesting if we could not show a 
cellular relevance of this complex. At this time the work on cellular relevance (as presented 
in 2.2.2) had not been initiated. Thus the relevance of the complex became an area of focus, 
and further initiated the above-described work by Gromyko. In addition to a general 
relevance in the form of a phenotype, Arnesen suggested that if we had a specific example of 
a protein that was acetylated by hNatC, and this had consequences for that protein, then the 
story would become significantly stronger. Thus, the formulation of an article is also a 
formulation of a narrative, a story. Indeed, it was often repeated by Lillehaug that we should 
not leave to many potential questions, to many angles of attack, for the reviewers of the 
journal. 
As a tentative outline of the manuscript was formulated, I also started working on making 
my experimental results more presentable (that was: doing experiments over again for 
making prettier images, cleaner signals from immunoprecipitation experiments etc.) as a 
beautiful image was considered more psychologically convincing than an ugly picture. It 
would take two more years from the start of formulating the hNatC manuscript before the 
article would be published in the journal Molecular and Cellular Biology (at that time impact 
factor 6.8). 
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2.3 The	  hNatC	  project	  part	  2:	  What	  is	  the	  function	  of	  hNatC?	  
I will now go on to describe the hNatC project as it has developed after the publication of 
2009. There is an methodological difference between the description of this part of the 
project, and the description given in part 2.2: while the former description was on projects 
already conducted and concluded, this part of the project is still on-going, and the result of 
the process is still open.  
2.3.1 What	  is	  the	  question?	  
After finishing the work of publishing the first paper, we (Lillehaug, Arnesen and me) 
decided that the hNatC project could be interesting to pursue further. There were two main 
reasons for this. On one hand the phenotypes were interesting: they had clinical and cell 
biological potential.  On the other hand it was an area with little competition, and thus we 
were hopefully allowed to develop the project without the fear of being scooped in the 
competition of getting our findings published. We decided further to concentrate on 
hNaa30p, and leaving hNaa35p and hNaa38p behind. This was due to practical 
considerations in terms of labor: focusing on only the catalytic subunit rather than all three 
allowed for more thorough work on hNaa30p. Biologically it was the hNaa30p-specific 
acetylation that was of particular interest. If this was connected to the hNatC complex or not 
was of less importance as the first goal was to find some specific function at all that could be 
connected to one specific NAT.  
The project now went into a phase where several hypotheses and topics were raised as 
potential continuations of the first article. The questions raised in this period was raised both 
on the basis of the work already conducted (as a direct continuation), on the basis of 
potential links pointed at in the literature, and on curiosity ("this was an interesting idea - 
let's try it!"). These enquiries often took the form of "let's see if there is something here". 
The different questions that were raised were pursued in various degrees. One question, the 
question of a connection between hNatC and cellular nutrition sensors was especially 
thoroughly investigated, as there was strong indications in the literature that hNatC did affect 
cellular nutrition response. Could hNaa30p have a function in the regulation of nutritional 
balance in the cell? If we were able to confirm this experimentally hNatC would have been 
connected to an area of large biological and medical relevance. Therefore, even as we did 
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not manage to obtain any consistent results about a role of hNatC in cellular nutrition 
sensing, we continued tuning these experiments for 2 years.  
When going back looking at various project descriptions (table 2.1) it is clear to me that 
there was a large fluctuation of what the project actually should be about.  
Gradually, the questions we raised became more and more connected to showing a role for 
hNaa30p with respect to various cellular processes. The underlying question was: what was 
the function of hNaa30p with respect to such processes? "Function" can be defined as “an 
activity or purpose natural to or intended for a person or thing”14. It is an “activity”: process, 
movement, transitive. It is a “purpose”, thus it is grounded in something outside itself. It is 
“natural” or “indented”, thus it is normative. To assess a function to a biological entity is to 
make a normative statement about the activity of the entity as seen from the context. As the 
discussion between Arnesen, Lillehaug, and me progressed, it became clear that we had to 
define what kind of function we were looking for. The molecular enzymatic function of 
hNaa30p was to perform acetylation, and to modify proteins. The cellular function of 
hNaa30p we knew little about, but this could potentially be several different independent 
functions connected to different cellular localizations and pathways15. And further on, 
hNaa30p could have a physiological function or even a social function.  
So the question became: what is the cellular function of hNaa30p? From here it was possible 
to take many ways. To get some hints we looked at what was known about Naa30p and 
NatC in the literature. The results we had from the first paper showed lack of growth and cell 
death, so one possibility was to look at factors connected to growth and cell death, and see if 
these somehow for example could be potential hNaa30p-substrates. The problem with this 
was that decreased cell growth and cell death can result from a number of processes, often 
being the endpoint of a general state of stress in the cell. We therefore figured that finding 
                                                
14 New Oxford American Dictionary in Apple Dictionary Version 2.1.3, 2005-2009 Apple Inc. 
15 hNatC can have evolved into local functions that are independent of each other. Or it may have one particular cellular 
function that can give a statement of the form “the cellular function of hNatC is f(x)”. As one cannot know this, one cannot 
know what experimental observations can be connected to each other, and what must be seen as independent phenomena. 
Also, when talking about phenotypes and functions, one must beware of primary effects, secondary effects etc. hNatC may 
affect something that again puts of a chain of events in the complex cellular system. Some of these events can be closely 
tied to hNatC functions, while other events may happen more as a consequence of other events. The interesting question is 
then of course: if large parts of the cellular system potentially are affected by a protein, how far into this system could one 
stretch the notion of "cellular protein function" for it to still make sense? If everything somehow affects everything, than 
definitions are indeed floating. 
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specific cellular functions from hNaa30p with regard to cell growth and cell death/cell 
survival could potentially be a tough job.  
Table 2.1 - Questions raised as potential continuations of the NatC project 
in the period after first publication. 
Month-year Question Investigated? 
August 2008 Are there more subunits in the hNatC complex? Initiated but terminated due to 
technical difficulties. 
August 2008 Does hNatC affect cellular nutrition sensors? Thoroughly investigated, but 
without positive result. 
September 2008 Through which mechanism is cell death 
mediated after hNaa30p-depletion? 
Thoroughly investigated, 
positive results. 
September 2009 Does hNatC influence organelle organization? Several experiments initiated, 
positive results.  
May 2010 Does hNaa30p change cellular localization 
after cellular stimulation? 
Pilot experiments, positive 
results, but terminated. 
September 2010 Does hNaa30p influence cellular nutrition 
balance responses?  
Thoroughly investigated, 
technical difficulties/negative 
results. 
 
But, as already mentioned, hNatC could have many functions. To show all of them were not 
only practically hard, it is also theoretically impossible as one never know what one doesen't 
know. So we should be satisfied if we could propose one cellular function of hNatC.  
A question that crystallized itself during this period was the question of organelles: did 
hNatC influence organelle organization16? This question seemed for me to attract itself 
several other exiting and interesting questions: organelles were involved in a wide array of 
processes in the cell and in the organism. It had biological and medical potential, it could be 
connected to our previous findings, and there was potential novelty. The next question was 
what we should try to observe after intervention. Again, several different alternatives were 
possible (Figure 2.2). As several links in the literature and databases pointed at the spatial 
organization of organelles, I decided to look at organelles through microscopy in hNaa30p-
depleted cells. This task was formulated as a master thesis, and a master student (Thomas 
Kalvik) started working on this in September 2009. 
                                                
16 As the pitfalls of subjectivity are present in this self-analysis of my scientific work, it is especially present here, where I 
give reasons for decisions in my own self-designed project. But I will try, and as covering one part usually unveils a 
different; should I fail to reveal the substantial about the project I may reveal something substantial about myself. 
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And indeed, when depleting hNaa30p from cells, Kalvik observed changes in the organelle 
organization of the cells. The result was repeated, and he counted the number of cells where 
the organelle organization had changed in hNaa30p-depleted cells as compared to a control, 
and the change was statistically significant. In addition he managed to show the effect of 
hNaa30p depletion on a protein involved in organelle organization (Kalvik, 2010). We had 
findings, and they were stabilized!  
The findings that hNaa30p somehow affected organelle organization could be the cellular 
function we were hoping for, what Pickering would call a bridgehead for further research 
(Pickering, 1997).  
 
Figure 2.2 Alternatives for possible routes of enquiry, February 2011.  
In January 2011 I started drafting a manuscript, where the data we had so far was included. 
And as I wrote the manuscript and got feedback from the co-authors, it became painstakingly 
clear to me that I did not have data that supported the statements I wanted to make. It was 
not that the data contradicted the statements it was rather that we lacked the experimental 
data that supported the statements that I wished to make. The advice was clear: what 
statements were the most important, which experiments were needed to address these 
statements, and what was realistic within a given time frame?  
As for today, effort is put into conducting more experiments that can investigate the role of 
hNaa30p in organelle organization. 
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3. How does the researcher produce knowledge? 
The main question raised in the aim of this study was: how does the researcher produce 
knowledge within the field of experimental molecular medicine? In part 1 I presented several 
thinkers who have addressed this question but which did not, in my opinion, give an 
adequate account of the process in its entirety. It was this process I set forth to understand. 
As the fact production of experimental biology and medicine reflects the complexity of its 
study matter, in part 2 I followed the advice from Bernard and Rheinberger and looked at a 
concrete case of experimental work, namely the work of the NAT-group at the University of 
Bergen. In this part I will use the works presented in part 1 and the case presented in part 2 
to make a philosophical reflection understand how knowledge is produced in experimental 
molecular medicine. Why does the NAT group conduct the work that we do in the way that 
we do, and what kind of knowledge do we strive to produce? 
I will first identify some of the conditions for the existence of the NAT-group and their 
work, and how these existence conditions come to constitute the conditions for validity of 
statements in the experimental context. I will then look at the temporal organization of the 
research project, and look at knowledge production as a process, before I describe the 
practical conduct of the experiments as a theory-practice where theory and practice is 
embedded in the process of knowledge. Last, I will point at some methodological problems 
that affect the knowledge produced in experimental molecular medicine. 
3.1 Conditions	  of	  experimental	  knowledge.	  
Worldviews, and thus also approaches for studying the world, are situated. They change with 
time and place. They are maintained in what Ludwik Fleck called "thought collectives" 
(Fleck, 1976 p.44), and what Foucault called epistemes (Foucault, 2006). In these collectives 
a conception of the world is developed, develops, and maintains what Foucault called 
discourses (Foucault, 2009), which further determines what is thinkable. It is within 
discourses in thought collectives that the conditions for different forms of activities and 
knowledge can be found. 
What are the conditions for the knowledge produced by the NAT-group? Canguilhem, 
Rheinberger, and Latour & Woolgar emphasized that knowledge production is an activity 
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that is historical and situated: certain societies produce certain practices at certain places at 
certain times. This produced specific types of knowledge. A question following from this is: 
what conditions at these places and times make the research activity and the resulting 
knowledge come about? More precise in the case of experimental molecular medicine: what 
are the conditions that lead to the material analysis as an adequate and widespread approach 
for solving medical problems?  
As briefly described in the introduction, Foucault distinguished between existence conditions 
and validity conditions (Utaker, 2009). The existence conditions are the conditions allowing 
a certain type of activity or discourse to arise at a certain time and place at all, and the 
validity conditions are the conditions for determining the validity of statements within this 
activity. I here want to look at what can be some of the existence conditions and validity 
conditions that constitute the material analysis of experimental molecular medicine, as 
exemplified by the existence and work of the NAT-group. 
3.1.1 Existence	  conditions	  of	  experimental	  molecular	  medicine.	  
The most recent white Paper on Research from the Norwegian Government,  
"Forskningsmelding no. 30, 2008-2009: Klima for forskning" (Climate for research) 
(Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2009) provides cultural and instrumental reasons for research. 
The cultural reasons include the development of civilization and culture and the inherent 
curiosity of humans. The instrumental reasons are to provide solutions that make it possible 
to improve society, solve problems, and facilitate economical growth. When a certain type of 
research is supported and funded one of the reasons is a belief that this type of activity, more 
than other types of activity (that is not funded or supported) will improve our culture and 
society, provide solutions to problems, and facilitate economic growth. It will be for the 
general good of society to a degree that it is worth prioritizing over other options17. As it is 
stated in the Paper of Research: 
"The development within molecular and gene technology gives us increased information about the 
patient and the disease's genetic portraits. There are large expectations for tailor-made treatment, 
which will give larger efficiency and reduction in side effects. Modern biotechnology, in cooperation 
                                                
17 Here it is important to differ between the normative intentions of research and health policy, and how these are realized 
through practical politics. I here merely wish to point at that there exist a trust in experimental molecular medicine not only 
within the research community itself, but in the Norwegian society in a broader sense. 
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with information and communication technology, and nanotechnology, puts us in a better position for 
prevention and treatment of diseases." (Kunnskapsdepartementet, 2009 p. 44, my translation) 
Medicine comes in many forms, and experimental molecular medicine is one of several 
approaches for achieving health and economical benefits on the basis of medical activity. 
Molecular medicine seeks to explain the causalities of disease at a molecular level, and 
through this develop methods of prevention, diagnosis, and treatment. This experimental 
approach to medicine can be seen as a continuation of Bernard's material analysis. Bernard's 
claim was that all biological phenomena could be understood exclusively through 
physiochemical properties in what I will call a physiochemical immanence. Therefore, one 
should not stop the enquiry with reference to for example vitalistic laws; one should further 
pursue the material analysis.  
This physiochemical approach is inspired from classical physics (up to Heisenberg and 
Bohr), which could be said to have a determinist and mechanistic worldview. It has indeed 
been seen in parts of molecular biology a belief that the whole of biology could be 
"explained" in terms of chemistry and physics18 (Rommetveit, 2007 p. 41). The current 
position of experimental molecular medicine research in western societies is such that it no 
longer has to argue to justify for its existence. The view of life as physiochemical and 
understandable by material analysis is widely accepted.  
From the view that life follows physiochemical laws, combined with the Darwinian theory 
of descent from a common ancestor (Darwin, 2003) it also follows a view of a continuity of 
life. Whether it is in genetic information storage, protein models, human cell culture, 
laboratory mice, or the human organism, it is asserted that the organisms are homologous, 
that is: similar due to ancestry, both within and across species. They are built up of the same 
constituents and they work by variations over the same mechanisms. Thus, we shall add the 
view of a continuity of life as another existence condition of experimental molecular 
medicine. This is not to say that results from bacterial experiments automatically are valid in 
human organisms. Rather, it is the assumption is that they somehow will or may be relevant.  
                                                
18 Rommetveit points at that the claim of totality was a characteristic of classical physics that was later abandoned in 
physics, but continued in molecular biology. It is indeed interesting to note that one rarely find explanations in molecular 
biology going beyond framework of classical physics (For an exception of this: Fleming G.R. & Scholes G.D., 2004. 
Physical chemistry: quantum mechanics for plants, Nature. Sep 16;431(7006):256-7.). 
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In the case of the NAT-group the work was initiated as a multi-disciplinary project, where 
material from the clinic was to be analyzed in the laboratory, and then the knowledge from 
the laboratory could be transferred back to the patient in the form of diagnosis or treatment. 
Underlying this approach there are two important presuppositions. First, it is assumed that 
the laboratory analysis will reveal some of the causalities of disease, and secondly that the 
work done in the laboratory on model systems such as human and bacterial cell cultures, will 
yield relevant explanations. In this we see the two suppositions of physiochemical 
immanence and continuity of life. 
One may speculate if it is the promise of full causal understanding of life that makes 
experimental molecular medicine appealing. From Canguilhem's philosophy we have that a 
certain approach to life also reflects a certain view of life. Perhaps the view of life in these 
sciences could be found in this promise of causal understanding of life. As Bernard claims: if 
we have the causal explanation of a phenomenon, the use of statistics is absurd (Bernard, 
1957 p. 136). The reductionist experimental molecular biology bears within itself the 
promise that chaos and multiplicity of life can and should be fully explained and thus 
controlled. In this material worldview, where the divine has retracted and there is nothing but 
physical laws, human understanding fills the resulting void. When the full causal 
understanding of the organism is known, the tailor-made treatment of disease can finally be a 
reality. 
This makes the existence of the NAT-group understandable: the expensive, time-consuming 
production of facts, years of work that are summed up in a 13-pages research article (in the 
case of the hNatC article) (Starheim et al., 2009) are made possible by the view of life as 
fully explainable. The effort will pay off, sooner or later, in the form of direct health 
benefits.  
3.1.2 Validity	  conditions	  of	  experimental	  molecular	  medicine.	  
The validity conditions are the conditions for determining the validity of statements within a 
field. The existence conditions constitute what is thinkable in the field of experimental 
molecular medicine, and thus frame the validity conditions. The existence conditions in the 
form of the physiochemical immanence give a unique status to the experiment as a way to 
gain knowledge about organisms. Thus, the experiment is the validity condition for 
experimental molecular medicine. The outcome of the experiment determines whether a 
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statement is valid or not. In the case of the identification of the hNatC subunits, the database 
prediction of a human NatC complex was not enough to make the statement "there exists a 
hNatC complex" valid. An experimental enquiry was needed to determine the validity of the 
statement. As we managed to register specific differences in the experimental setup, these 
were used to determine whether there existed a NatC-complex or not. 
The validity of the statement is further determined by the quality of the experimental setup: 
is the setup appropriate to do the intended determinations? Is the immunoprecipitation 
experiment adequate for determining if there exists an hNatC complex or not? As 
Rheinberger describes, the experiment is designed to register specific differences. The fear 
of the researchers is that as the method aims at showing specific differences there may be 
unknown variables that give "unspecific differences". For example, we used a method for 
depleting hNaa30p in order to see what happens when hNaa30p is lacking in the cell. But we 
cannot know whether the method used for depleting hNaa30p specifically also can have 
other effects that are not shared by the control. If the setup is found invalid the conclusions 
from the setup are also invalid. The problem is that the experimental setups do not have any 
absolute frames of reference. The references used are internal controls and other 
experimental setups, which both are relative controls constituted by the same existence 
conditions as the experiment itself. When Latour mentions the fear of a statement being 
dismissed and undressed as an artefact, it is the questioning of whether the output of the 
setup actually gives this information. Indeed, this may explain the obsessive focus on 
methodology that is found within experimental life science. 
3.2 The	  project	  as	  organizational	  structure.	  
I have now described some of the presuppositions for the existence of the experimental 
approach to life. Experimental molecular medicine has grown from a belief that knowledge 
is needed to address problems of health and well-being, that this knowledge is the 
knowledge about underlying causes originating in the physiochemical properties of living 
beings, and that material analysis of the molecular build-up of living systems will provide 
answers to the problems. This has further led to the formation of the practical-theoretical 
field of experimental molecular medicine, where the experimental setup is the main authority 
in the production of facts. Thus, the process of fact-production is a practice where the 
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theoretical knowledge within the field, the facts derived from earlier experiments, the 
embodiment of theories in technology, and the practical skill of the experimenter are tuned 
to capture new epistemic objects.  
This process is both theoretical and practical. The knowledge production is dependent on the 
skill, knowledge, and work of people. Latour & Woolgar and Rheinberger have given us 
understandings of this knowledge production as both social and practical. In this process, it 
is of utmost importance for the scientists to organize the scientific process. At any moment 
in the research process the possible ways for further enquiry are numerous, as so are the 
possible factors that can be included in the enquiry. As experimental work is both costly, 
time consuming, and labor demanding, following any of these ways will require large 
efforts. The scientists therefore needs to focus and define their work, and economize their 
time.  
Important in this respect is the comment of Rheinberger that experimental work oscillates 
between subversion and confirmation. In order to facilitate new understanding and objects, 
the experimental process must be subversive. In order to produce statements, it must 
stabilize and confirm objects or entities. The challenge is to find a balance between the 
phases of subversion and confirmation: to organize what Pickering calls the dialectic process 
of accommodation and resistance that is the mangling of practice (Pickering, 1997). What I 
here wish to show is that these processes and acts of subversion, accommodation, and 
stabilization, are sought controlled and organized. To do this I will establish some notions 
that can describe the organizational aspects of the research process, a process that is at the 
same time practical, theoretical, tactical, and situated.  
3.2.1 Projects	  as	  narratives.	  
As we have seen from the case studies, the theoretical-practical processes proceeds 
differently for the different cases. Rather then in a "linear" fashion of encountering a 
problem, raising a question related to this problem, proposing a hypothesis as an answer to 
the question, performing an experiment to test the hypothesis, interpreting the result from the 
experiment, and using this to solve the problem, these stages can co-exist in an entangled 
relationship. This includes ideas, hypothesis and theories, experiments and interpretations, 
but also decisions and evaluations about what paths to follow, what is practically feasible, 
and how resources should be distributed. This loosely organized process I will term a 
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research project. The thesaurus19 gives several definitions of "project", among which are 
plan, program, enterprise, venture, proposal, idea, concept scheme, assignment, piece of 
work, all of which indeed are involved in the process that forms a scientific project.  
Defining something as a project makes possible for the scientists a certain narrative, a certain 
scope and delineation of objects of study and the work done on these. I here use the term 
narrative as a cognitive structure with a certain coherence that allows the parts to fit into a 
whole, and the whole to be constituted by the parts. There are several factors that influence 
the organization of a research project. 
1. The known and potential epistemic phenomena that the project relates to through claiming 
that the project is about these phenomena. The known and potential epistemic phenomena 
create focus for the work of the group as the work is aimed at these objects. For the here-
described case, the main phenomenon is the hNatC complex. This organizes sub-goals such 
as identification of the hNatC complex, relevance of the hNatC complex, and function of the 
hNatC complex. The epistemic phenomena (I here deliberately use "phenomena" instead of 
Rheinbergers "objects" or "things" as this also captures processes and relations) that are the 
centre of the work can change as long as the work serves some purpose worth pursuing. 
Jerome Ravetz has explained this by distinguishing between scientific goals, such as 
identifying a protein complex, and purposes, such as curing cancer or accumulating 
knowledge. As long as the scientific purposes are found meaningful, the drift of goals is less 
problematic (Ravetz, 1996). The epistemic phenomena that are involved in the concrete 
research goals be maintained as long as they are potent motors for maintaining a fecund 
project.  
As an example of this was the effort to find a causal relation between hNatC and nutrient 
response: if we had managed to see such a relation the factors of nutrient response would 
take a major role in the further work of the hNatC project. The purpose of the work could 
then be shifted towards questions about metabolic regulation of cellular activity, which 
indeed is an interesting field! But, as we did not manage to show such a relation this enquiry 
was aborted.  
                                                
19 New Oxford American Dictionary in Apple Dictionary Version 2.1.3, 2005-2009 Apple Inc. 
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2. The value field as defined by human health and pathology. The perspective of health and 
pathology organizes choices through adding values to different alternatives. Alternatives that 
are (potentially) more related to human health and pathology than other similar alternatives 
will be prioritized. They will be prioritized with respect to value laden organizing entities in 
the value field. This can also take an indirect form through considerations of biological 
relevance. When something is important for the state of the organism or cell it is assumed 
that it will also be relevant for health and disease.  
When seeing the different questions posed in the process of formulating the functional part 
of the hNatC complex, we see that the research project is somewhat promiscuous with 
respect to how the relevance to health and pathology takes form. It is enough that it is 
relevant, preferentially to cancer. But if it is relevant to neurological diseases, that will be the 
focus instead. Thus, the relevance for health and disease governs choices that are made, but 
it also forms a reserve that the scientists can draw upon when claiming the importance of 
their work. The relevance for health and disease is indeed what Ravetz would call a purpose 
of the work. 
3. The experimental system used to perform the work. Rheinberger claims that the process of 
knowledge production within experimental life science starts with choice of experimental 
system. In many situations the choice of system and the formulation of problems is a 
reciprocal process. The choice of experimental system will depend on what problems one is 
interested in pursuing, but also the experimental system at hand affects what problems are 
posed. This latter point is important, as the establishment of an experimental system is one of 
the largest investments a scientist makes. Establishing infrastructure, knowledge, and 
methodology of an experimental system is both expensive and laborious. The establishment 
of a model system may thus more often lead to that the model system affects the questions 
posed rather than the other way around. 
As Rheinberger describes, different experimental model systems have different opportunities 
and limitations. The experimental model used in the hNatC project was human cell-culture. 
This system was available at the group before the project was initiated. The strength of this 
system is that it is of human origin, it is relatively simple to handle, and it has a lower 
complexity as compared to vertebrate whole-organism systems such as mouse. The 
limitations are that the simplicity goes on behalf of the physiological relevance, it is more 
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complex than for example systems such as yeast, and it is not that easily manipulated as for 
example fruit fly (Drosophila melanogaster). The human cell culture system is thus a trade-
off between relevance and simplicity.  
For the researchers it is therefore necessary to address the questions that make use of the 
power of the chosen model system in a best possible manner. In addition, it is important to 
see what the model system cannot say anything about NatC. The complex had already been 
studied in yeast. Studies in human cell lines could add knowledge about the role of NatC in 
human cell biology, and possibly relevance of the NatC complex with respect to human 
disease. What the human cell line system could not do was to give valid statements about 
links to human disease, or about roles of NatC in a physiological perspective. To further 
address the physiological role of Naa30p we in spring of 2011 initiated studies of Naa30p in 
Drosophila melanogaster. 
4. Practical-tactical considerations of what can be done within certain frames of time and 
effort. As the production of knowledge through experimental work is laborious and 
financially expensive, considerations are made to manage time and resources with respect to 
point 1) and 2) above. Driving factors are funding and competition within the field (pressure 
to publish first etc.). Experimental work is also framed both by length of employment of the 
researchers, often ranging from a few months to 4-5 years for the active experimenters. In 
most employments there are demands for outcome in the form of publications, thesis or 
similar.  
This aspect of research-organization is relevant for the politics of research, publication, and 
education, and could indeed be the subject for a thesis on its own. Latour & Woolgar has 
addressed the tactical and career-oriented considerations involved in research in the section 
"Cycles of credit" in "Laboratory life" (Latour & Woolgar, 1986 chapter 5). What I rather 
want to emphasize here is that these factors affect what kind of knowledge is produced. One 
possible outcome of the above-presented situation is that researchers do not start projects 
with a long time frame and an uncertain outcome, but rather go for quick and safe projects 
(see for example (Alon, 2009) for a reflection over project design).      
As for our case study, the decision of starting to study the hNatC complex was not only a 
decision about studying hNatC. It was also a choice of a topic that could give a master-
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thesis, a research paper, and possibly go into a PhD-thesis within realistic limits of time and 
cost. Initially, the work of studying the hNatC complex followed the same path as was used 
for the studies of the hNatA complex: immunoprecipitation, studying cell growth and cell 
death etc. Thus, the scope of the project was loosely considered to be identification and 
initial biological characterization, a work that was possible to do within appropriate time 
frames, with low investments into new methodology, possible to do for a master-student 
(later PhD-student).  
5. The expected outcome of the research process. The main outcome of the scientific activity 
of the group is new descriptions and understandings of molecular biological phenomena and 
constituents, and tools and technology related to these. This can include chemical 
compounds for use in research or therapy, methods for clinical application such as markers 
for diagnosis and prognosis or targets for therapy, and patents. But also more general outputs 
such as increased knowledge within the field. These are all factors that determine the aims 
and goals for the research - they are involved in determining the value field. But perhaps a 
bit surprising (at least for non-academics) is that if one is to determine from the daily 
activity, the main focus for the research group is to publish scientific papers containing 
scientific statements. The scientific paper indeed has a very strong position and status within 
the scientific community, although it is only a medium for reporting the activity of the 
laboratory. This brings us to the next point, namely the rhetorical structure of knowledge. 
6. The rhetorical structure of knowledge. The work and findings of the group is mainly 
presented in the form of a scientific paper. The process through which the paper is evaluated, 
namely the peer-review-process, strengthen Latour's & Woolgar's claim that the scientific 
process also is a rhetorical process. By this I do not mean rhetorical in the sense that the 
scientist creates an illusion. Rather, I follow the Aristotelian definition of rhetoric as "the 
faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion" (Aristotle, 2004) 
Section I.2).  It is important for the scientists that the statements they make are presented in a 
convincing manner. The ethos is established by a proper presentation of the authors as 
researchers (institutions and affiliations), and the proper scientific language. Fleck here 
points at the importance of presenting statements in a manner that is recognized by the 
thought collective. Tapping into the scientific mood and genre of the thought style will 
immediately awaken a feeling of trust and recognition by the reader (Fleck, 1976 p.145). 
Also, the research process will often be presented as a rational and logical process. This may 
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also give an answer to why the purification of facts is necessary: when claiming to speak 
about the truth the scientist wins authority. Logos is provided by a connection between 
statements and validity conditions through reference to trustable experimental setups. Patos 
may perhaps be found in the insisting that the presented statements are objectively true 
statements about nature. 
The rhetorical aspect of science also includes to the use of narratives. Narratives are used in 
two ways: as a cognitive structuring of knowledge for the scientists themselves, and as a 
coherent presentation of their work to others. First, a narrative can work as a cognitive 
structure that provides a context for the statements produced (Starheim, 2010). The narrative 
will differ from concepts or theories by that it includes the self-understanding of activity of 
the scientist. It is how the scientists, in Latour & Woolgar's words, give meaning to their 
work. A narrative in our case study can be the following: "N-α-acetylation is one of the most 
common protein modifications in eukaryotes. Still, no one understands the function of it! 
Our group is unraveling the function of this modification in humans. It turns out that it has 
potentially important implications for human health".  
Secondly, when scientific statements are presented to others (in the form of publications or 
similar) narratives are deliberatively used to make the scientific work more convincing. 
Often, a scientific paper will present scientific experiments and findings in a logical order, 
tied together with "... and then we ...", or "to investigate this ...". But this logical structure is 
often more a chronology added in retrospect; where as the work itself often is more trial and 
error. This does not mean that there cannot be coherence in a work. But it is often the case 
that this coherence is more obvious at later stages of a project. Some thinkers, like Thomas 
Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend has distinguished between a context of discovery, where a 
phenomena does not have to be presented in a rational and logical manner, and a context of 
justification, where the phenomenon is to be stabilized, explained and characterized in a 
rational manner (Hoyningen-Huene, 2006; Feyerabend, 1996 p. 147). The reasons why 
scientific work is presented in narratives can be several. It is easier to both understand 
findings when they are presented in coherence. It is harder to find angles of criticism when 
the canvas of the narrative is stretched. Also, it defines the limits of what the statements 
claim and do not claim, it creates a delineation that is coherent for the whole of the presented 
work.  
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The narrative presentation of knowledge plays an important role in shaping the experimental 
process. Even though experiments are not planned with respect to a narrative presentation of 
the outcome of the experiment, the narrative will start to affect the choice of experiments as 
potential narratives starts to emerge from the results of the experiments. In the example of 
hNatC, the choices of performing cell growth and cell death experiments was done after the 
complex was identified in order to be able to expand the narrative to also involve a more 
direct indication of relevance to human health and disease. This is, indeed, to "start thinking 
paper". Hence the proverb that "when writing your thesis, the last thing you write is the aim 
of the study". This is due to that you don't know how the narrative will look like until you 
know the parts that constitute this whole.  
This process of creating what Jerome Bruner called narrative facts (Bruner, 1998) is indeed 
an important factor of what Latour calls the purification of facts: the process of changing the 
epistemic status of an epistemic object or trace into a valid statement about nature. In 
creating the narrative, the important is chosen before the less important.  
Through these factors the project is a way of organizing the research process on different 
levels, from the different projects that individual lab members have, to the project of the 
group as a whole. It delineates different focuses from other, it makes possible to focus 
interests and efforts, use time and resources in a more efficient way, build up a more clear-
cut and defined expertise, and make up a self-understanding.  
3.2.2 Openness	  and	  closedness	  of	  the	  scientifc	  process.	  
Rheinberger describes the experimental system as oscillating between phases of subversion 
and stabilization. There are phases when novel entities are searched for, and there are phases 
when such entities are stabilized - reproduced, controlled, and formulated. I suggest that this 
subversion and stabilization is a consequence of a dynamic in the research process, namely 
that the degree of openness and closedness varies throughout the process. What I am trying 
to capture with these notions is the evaluation of alternatives at given points of time in the 
project process: what alternatives are considered realistic paths to follow at different stages 
in the process.  
In the research process, there are a hypothesis-generating phases, where various alternatives 
are formulated - processes of opening up, phases of evaluation, weighting, and testing 
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alternatives, and phases of focusing on a few alternatives in order to stabilize findings. As 
mentioned previously, these phases does not necessarily follow a linear progression, but they 
affect the process through constituting the priorities that are made continuously throughout 
the process. In an open phase a hypothesis-generating experiment can be chosen before 
experiments of repeating a possible finding. In a closed phase emphasis is put on confirming 
and stabilizing an epistemic object.  
Pickering touches upon this dynamic. He describes scientific knowledge as representational 
chains that capture and frame material agency through various concepts. This process he 
views as a cultural extension that can be lead in different directions. The first phase of the 
extension he call bridging: an open-ended phase where the scientist(s) "tentatively fixes a 
vector of cultural extension to be explored". During the second phase, transcription, 
established moves from previous systems and procedures are moved into the new space of 
cultural extension, whereas in the third phase, filling, the new system is completed on the 
basis of the bridgehead and the accommodation of procedures to the new system (Pickering, 
1997 p.117). For Pickering, the first phase is one of association, the second is the one where 
material agency is the active part (performance of experiment), and the third phase is the 
interpretation. In the second and third phase the scientist tries to frame material agency by 
accommodating and interpreting the resistances of the material agency. Although these 
conceptions bear similarities to my notions of openness and closedness, they describe a more 
immanent level of the actor-agency relation. Included in the notions of openness and 
closedness is that that the enquiry towards material agency also is an investment, and that 
there is at any time a large number of possible ways to direct the enquiry. Thus the concrete 
decisions that are being made are also dependent on practical-tactical considerations. 
The stages of openness and closedness are quite different for the identification-project and 
the functional project described in the case study. Some projects can be considered more 
“safe” than others, with methods and biological knowledge more stabilized. Examples of this 
are the identification of subunits of hNatC. Here, we had a pretty good idea about how the 
conclusion could look like in advance. As for the task of functional characterization, the 
research process has been quite different. Figure 2.2 illustrates the different degrees of 
openness and closedness in the hNaa30p-function project. Where the project of identification 
started with a clear hypothesis and ended with giving the findings from this hypothesis, the 
functional project have to a large extent been about finding out what the project should be 
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about; defining alternatives, choosing between these, and again seeing what new alternatives 
this opened for. The projects in themselves from the beginning harbored different degrees of 
openness. This does not mean that every project goes from an open to a closed state, or 
proceed in a planned manner. In the identification project we also considered doing 
experiments that would open for potentially finding other subunits for the hNatC complex. 
This would further lead to a process of studying these. But as opening up a research process 
will beg for a subsequent process of stabilizing and thus a longer time perspective, we 
prioritized stabilizing of the subunits we had already started studying. 
The continuous evaluation of the research process with regard to openness and closedness is 
indeed a skill of the trained project leader. Keeping a process open may lead to several novel 
findings, but it can also lead to stagnation due to lack of focus. Keeping the process too 
closed, embarking only on projects where the result and relevance can be predicted in 
advance can merely amount to the filling obvious gaps of knowledge within a field. Such 
works may indeed be necessary - it was necessary for us to show that there was an hNatC-
complex in humans before we started further studies. But as such findings does not, in the 
words of Rheinberger, lead to major rearrangements of the knowledge, a group that only 
does such work will not set the agenda within a field. 
Again it is indeed worth raising the question of whether the current situation of research, 
with high levels of competition, demands for publication, efficiency, and short-term 
employments and funding drive researchers towards more closed states of research. If such 
were the case, this would go on behalf of the subversive, creative and inventive sides of 
research, as these are the more risky and open phases of the research process. On a macro-
level one might see experimental molecular science moving towards a self-reinforcing 
direction, where consensus is sought on behalf of a critical attitude. 
3.3 Experimental	  work	  is	  a	  thought-­‐practice.	  
In the previous chapters I described the presupposition of experimental knowledge 
production and the organization of this knowledge production. I will now focus on the 
concrete experimental research situation. To avoid an overly strict dichotomy between 
mental and practical operations I will use the notion of thought-practice to describe the 
concrete experimental work. The reason for this is that in experimental molecular medicine 
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mental and practical operations both have the same objects and they are intrinsically 
entangled to each other and to their objects. Theories are intrinsic in the technology and 
practice of experimentation through phenomenotechnology (Castelão-Lawless, 1995), and 
the theories are shaped by the practice for example through the process of mangling 
(Pickering, 1997). Furthermore, it is important to note that experimental molecular medicine 
has a craftsmanship-aspect that includes implicit and explicit knowledge (what Michel 
Polanyi called the tacit dimension of experimental work (Polanyi, 1958)), trained hands, and 
a practical organization of conduct. Equipped with the concept of thought-practice I will now 
try to give a description and understanding of the concrete situation of experimental 
knowledge production in molecular medicine. 
3.3.1 From	  the	  known	  to	  the	  unknown:	  the	  relation	  to	  previous	  knowledge.	  
As presented in 3.1.2 the experiment is a central source and argument of knowledge 
production in experimental molecular medicine. When designing an experiment one aims at 
using the known to capture the unknown. From the network of established knowledge, one 
can know what one doesn’t know. From the knowledge of manipulation and technology, one 
can know how to get expand into fields of this "known unknown". Rheinberger describes 
this movement into the unknown as both conservative, in the sense that the new is framed 
and made possible by the known, and subversive, as the new will change the understanding 
of the previously known. All knowledge will be dependent on previous knowledge, and all 
new phenomena will, through resistances and unanticipated characteristics, somehow change 
the previous knowledge and understanding. This leads to a change and re-interpretation of 
the scientific knowledge that can be both conscious and unconscious.  
Thus, the new knowledge produced is at least partly dependent on our prior understanding, 
and on what new knowledge can be anticipated. In the research process such anticipations 
can take the form of what is called "links", that is vague hints and loosely connected 
relations in the body of knowledge, pointing at some vague correlation or crossing point or 
tangent. My use of the term "link" is similar both to Pickering's use of the term "linkage" 
Pickering describes scientific knowledge as "representational chains ascending and 
descending through layers of conceptual multiplicity and terminating in captures and 
framings of material agency, with the substance and alignments of all the elements in these 
chains formed in mangling". Scientific questions are developed as associations and linkages 
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along these representational chains (Pickering, 1997 pp.100-101). Also Ludwik Fleck has 
described this use of previous knowledge for the production of new phenomena with his 
terms active and passive linkages, where the active linkage is the stipulation from the 
existing knowledge into an understanding of the object of study, and the passive linkage is 
the assumed unknown interconnections in the object of study that can constrain and resist 
and direct the understanding of the object of study (Fleck, 1976 p. 95; Cohen, Schnelle, & 
Fleck, 1986 p. xxx).  
The work of finding a function of the hNatC complex has largely consisted in looking for 
and testing links. An example of such a link was the encounter of organelle-related terms 
when looking for processes connected to hNatC function in databases and literature. The 
literature and knowledge of the field makes in this way up a network that the researcher uses 
for the formulation of problems, ideas, and hypothesis. This relation to a network of 
knowledge gives intertextuality an important role. Statements that are produced in an 
experimental work are produced with relation to both the experimental setup and output, and 
to the previous statements in the field. The connection between the theoretical and the 
material is made possible by the phenomenotechnical properties of the experimental system. 
This creates a theoretical-material matrix of understanding. 
The relation of a particular experiment to previous knowledge is both one of practice to more 
general theory, and of practice to specific knowledge about specific cases. The hNatC work 
relates to the specific work that is done on NatC in yeast. In addition one can say that it also 
relates to general theories such as the central dogma of molecular biology (information 
transfer from DNA-RNA-protein) and evolutionary theory. Indeed, there are a number of 
general concepts in molecular biology and medicine, but instead of taking for example a 
mathematical or an axiomatic form they take the form of descriptive statements with high 
generality, such as "changing the structure of a protein will affect the function of the 
protein".  Interestingly, as general concepts are taken for granted, they are often "silent". 
This may be the reason behind the claim that biology does not have many general theories 
and concepts as compared to more mathematically based sciences such as physics. Thus, the 
experimenter has two kinds of relations to previous knowledge: a conscious relation to the 
specific experimental works that relate to his/hers work, and an unconscious relation to the 
taken-for-granted concepts and facts in the field (the level-5-statements of "taken-for-granted 
facts" in the hierarchy of Latour & Woolgar). Knowing specificities and examples of general 
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workings of the system allows the researcher to think within the network, and in this way get 
anticipations of links, raise questions etc. 
3.3.2 Chain	  of	  thought-­‐practice.	  
The process of thought-practice is harbored within the scientific community, where 
individuals alone and in cooperation perform the theoretical-practical operations. Thus, the 
personal abilities will affect the research conduct. I will here mention some factors that 
impact the individual scientist's performance of the experimental thought-practice.    
The scientist's familiarity with the existing knowledge within the field determines which 
questions that can actually be raised, what scenarios that can be imagined. Also important 
here is to have an understanding of the knowledge. This is necessary to see links and 
possibilities, and to separate the important from the less important. Such understanding must 
also include an understanding of the experimental systems. As the experimental systems 
harbor certain understandings of material agency, the researcher must connect the 
technological knowledge to the knowledge within the field in order to organize the material 
agency for the emergence of new epistemic things.  
What is actually done of the planned experiments is dependent on the ability to conduct 
experiments. Most experiments do not lead directly to scientific findings. In many cases the 
experimental work is a process of trying to make an adequate setup for registering the 
specific differences of interest. This depends on the skills of the scientist. A trained 
experimenter will be able to reach a point of deciding setup faster than an untrained 
experimenter, who often will have problems with getting reproducible signals from the setup 
(as an example, the first year of my work on immunoprecipitation of hNatC mostly consisted 
in trying to actually do an immunoprecipitation).  
Whether a setup works is further dependent on whether any resonance can be achieved with 
the material of interest. The setup and intervention of an experiment depends on the 
understanding of the material of study and an anticipation of a certain reaction from the 
material as a response to the intervention. But the material of study can react in unexpected 
manners - it is an agency not under full control of the researcher. In such cases, the 
understanding of the material lacks to capture some characteristics that make it behave in 
such and such manner. The unexpected reaction must be in a conceivable form, for if not the 
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behavior will simply not be understood. If it can be conceived within the framework of 
articulation and understanding of the material, then the scientist can draw the reaction into 
the network of knowledge and use this to create a new understanding or new questions that 
can be the subject of experimental enquiry. It is this process that Andrew Pickering calls the 
mangling of practice: a process of accommodation, material resistance, and tuning of the 
experimental setup for a new accommodation and the framing of material agency (Pickering, 
1997). Through this process, the material of study affects the research process in a non-
random manner. But since it manifests itself in a "negative" manner, it cannot be fully 
described as one does not know what one does not know. Thus, the formulation of an 
understanding will not be a direct representation of a material state.  
The relation between mental and practical operations is to a large extent dependent on the 
particular situation. The idea, question, or hypothesis, is used to make an experimental setup 
that can capture a specific difference that can in some way give information back to the idea 
or question. This can take the form of a defined question, a loose enquiry, or for some 
experiments not even much of a preconceived idea, as the point of the experiment is to give 
rise to new ideas. Rheinberger describes such conceptual indeterminacy as a necessary 
characteristic of the scientific process as it provides the necessary flexibility to keep the 
project in touch with a fecund and relevant problem-field: to keep up-to-date with and define 
the border between described and unknown. 
On this basis the experimental scientist designs projects, formulates questions, and plans 
experiments. And it is here we can see how the creativity of individuals applies to scientific 
work. As the path forward is dependent the understanding the creation of an understanding 
of the previous knowledge, the questions that a scientist manage to raise depends on the 
intellectual and creative work done on this body of knowledge. This is most apparent when 
encountering extraordinary original scientific works.  One such example is Francis Crick's 
formulation of the central dogma of information transfer in molecular biology (Crick, 1970). 
3.3.3 The	  experiment	  detects	  specific	  differences.	  
The aim of the experimental setup is to, with Rheinbergers words, create a space of 
representation where specific differences between epistemic objects are manifested. These 
differences must be of such a manner that they can give an answer to a posed question. Of 
the given hNatC candidate proteins, which of them interacted to form a complex? The 
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immunoprecipitation experiment addressed the binding properties of the proteins. The 
difference in binding properties was the specific difference of interest.  
The experiment is based upon the manipulation of a more or less controlled matrix of 
physiochemical parameters and biological constituents in such a way that differences are 
manifested within the matrix. A research experiment will aim at manifesting hitherto un-
manifested differences. In order for the differences to be interpretable, the setup needs to be 
designed in a constrained manner so that the differences produced are specific. Ideally, all 
variables relevant for the outcome of the experiment should be known so that the outcome 
will be unequivocal. As I described in the section about validity conditions of experimental 
knowledge, it is the ability of the experiment to show specific differences between material 
identities that makes the material analysis a fecund producer of scientific knowledge. 
Therefore, the choice of experimental system - the definition of the matrix, is crucial for the 
questions asked.  
Here one can draw the line of reasoning from Bernard to Rheinberger: the knowledge we 
derive from the experiment is relational. Through bringing forth specific differences it 
separates one identity from another. This relation between difference and identity constitutes 
the epistemic things that resonance in the experimental system. A difference cannot 
resonance in itself, but two identities can give resonance in different ways: they manifest 
themselves as different traces in the system.  
The philosophy of difference, as seen in various versions with Derrida and Deleuze among 
others (Deleuze, 1994; Derrida, 2005) can be seen as a critique of the traditional priority of 
identity that traditionally was given in European metaphysics after Aristoteles20. 
Rheinberger, and also Latour in later works, has showed that this philosophy of difference is 
well applicable to experimental dynamics. Rheinberger gives a Derridean account for his 
notion of difference in experimental systems (Rheinberger, 1997 p. 76). Here I will not go 
more thoroughly into the philosophy of difference, but constrain myself to saying that 
difference and relations are both fundamental categories for how new entities manifest 
                                                
20 As a remark on the side I will suggest that giving one priority over another veils the identity-difference-relation as a 
composite notion, in this relation identity constitutes difference and reciprocal. That does not mean that difference does not 
have a central place in practical enquiries into the unknown, for what is the "unknown" other than an identity of absence - a 
bank of fog where nothing is seen before contours - differences - can be made out in the gray, contours made out of 
identities. 
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themselves in experimental systems, and they practical and applicable notions for 
understanding how an experimental setup is designed.  
3.4 Some	  methodological	  problems	  of	  experimental	  molecular	  medicine.	  
3.4.1 Blind	  zones	  in	  experimental	  knowledge	  produciton.	  
There are some aspects inherent in the methodology and approach of experimental molecular 
medicine and life science that shapes the knowledge in such a manner that we can expect 
certain types of knowledge to go on behalf of other types. I will here mention two such 
aspects.  
The narrow specificity of phenomenotechnological tools. The methods within molecular 
biology and medicine often aim at expanding our range of perception through representing 
for our senses entities that we cannot directly perceive. A functional protein cannot be seen 
by the naked eye. Neither can a regular human cell. As the entities are represented through a 
method, this creates a layer of epistemic uncertainty to the represented as it also means that 
we have no frame of reference to the things represented except for the methods themselves. 
If we were studying butterflies, we could be pretty sure that butterflies exist, as far as our 
senses gives us information about the world around us. When studying enzymes, we can be 
pretty sure that these exist, as far as our methods give information about the world around 
us, and we have an adequate understanding of these methods. This understanding is more 
uncertain as it contains several points of suppositions than direct perception. In the case of 
the immunoprecipitation we presuppose the existence of cells, proteins, antibodies with 
binding capacities, the effect of different salts and detergents in the washing process, 
polymerisation capacity, electrical fields, and charge in the analysis process. This is indeed 
not unique for molecular medicine and biology, but the point is that it makes the knowledge 
within the field more abstract as it is dependent on technical-theoretical understanding, and 
more uncertain as it is dependent on this understanding.  
It is in this light the description Rheinberger give of experimental setups is interesting. He 
describes the design of experimental setups as creating new spaces of representation. For 
Rheinberger, a certain type of knowledge is made possible by the methods that allow for the 
representation of entities. Molecular biology was only possible after the development 
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technologies such as the electron microscope, radioactive isotopes, and genetic models. Prior 
to these technologies, one had no possibility of perceiving sub-cellular entities.  
In his work "Representing and Intervening" Ian Hacking discusses this as an aspect of 
scientific observation (Hacking, 1983). Hacking's point is that observation comes in many 
forms. Although an experimental system is dependent on a set of theory, one may very well 
do observations in the system that intuitively spark interest, without putting to many 
theoretical assumptions into a spark of curiosity. But maybe more interesting in our case, 
Hacking claims that it is the disunity of science that allows for such mediated observations. 
The theories behind electric charge or plastic polymerization are not something we directly 
include in our understanding of the hNatC complex. Rather, we use one batch of theoretical 
assumptions within one field to observe another field with its own batch of theoretical 
assumptions. Assuming that the assumptions of the different fields somehow are relevant for 
each other.   
My point is that often, what is manifested in an experimental system is very specific: the 
method only gives us information about that which we design the experiment to capture. The 
representations of entities through a method create a "blindness" as we cannot know what the 
method does not capture or see. The immunoprecipitation of hNatC subunits made it 
possible to determine if some of the chosen proteins formed a complex. It did not give us 
information about whether there were more subunits in such a complex, if the registered 
complex was a functionally important one, etc. The above-presented problem of confirming 
versus revoking results must be seen as a coming from this. The easiest conclusions to draw 
from an experiment are specific confirming conclusions, thus favoring a certain type of 
observations in the knowledge production. 
This makes the knowledge within molecular biology and medicine sensitive to changes in 
understanding. It should also lead to extra precautions in the application of experimental 
knowledge, as there is an extra layer of uncertainty and bias in the knowledge.  
This blindness has consequences for the interpretation of experimental output. There is an 
asymmetry between the status of confirmative and revoking statements, or positive and 
negative results, resulting from experimental output. I will here define a negative result as a 
result that does not produce a trace in the space of representation of the experimental system. 
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Doing the immunoprecipitation experiment, we could register that we had 
immunoprecipitated hMAK3 and hMAK31 together with hMAK10. This showed that 
however little generality could be ascribed to such an interaction it nevertheless could 
happen in a human model system. In the case of NAT5 we did not detect hNAT5 in the 
hMAK10 immunboprecipitates. But making a statement about the interaction, or the lack of 
interaction between hNAT5 and hMAK10, is more complicated. We could not know we did 
not detect hNAT5 in the immunoprecipitates was due to methodological limitations, that the 
proteins did not interact in this cell type, that the proteins did not interact in this cell state, or 
that they actually never interact. The only statement we could make was that in this setup, 
under these experimental conditions, we could not detect hNAT5 in the hMAK10 
immunoprecipitate.  
This is an example of what I will call counter-Popperian argumentation. Popper proposed the 
falsification requirement for scientific statements: a scientific statement is a statement that 
can be falsified, and all hypotheses should be formulated in such a manner that they can be 
falsified (Lübcke, 2003). In the case of the immunoprecipitation experiment the reasoning is 
opposite: if we manage to show that an interaction can happen (as compared to the controls) 
in some biological setting, this forms the basis for the scientific statement "proteins x and x 
can interact". If they fail to interact in other setups, this does not falsify the first result as 
biological systems and experiments are dependent on the experimental conditions. On the 
other hand, if we fail to see an interaction between x and x (or more specific: if we do not 
register a trace in the experimental system), this is not a falsification as we cannot know the 
reason for the lack of trace. To further complicate things, the initial immunoprecipitation 
experiments did not register interactions between MAK10 and any of the tested proteins. 
Still we continued to repeat the experiment and tuning the experimental conditions until we 
managed to obtain a reproducible specific interaction. In a Popperian line of thought this is 
indeed almost absurd, but in the line of Pickering this is the process of mangling: the tuning 
of the experiment with respect to resistances in the material agency. We do not know 
whether the interaction represents something general or rather something more specific or 
rare.  
Topology of the value field. As mentioned in section 4.1.2 the view of a disinterested science 
is hardly a realistic description. In order to sort and evaluate knowledge, it will always be 
evaluated with respect to something. It is positioned in what I called a value field. The result 
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of this is that our knowledge about biological systems centers on entities and processes 
known to be valuable in the established value field. The topology of the value field will be 
dependent on the knowledge within the field, and of the understanding of what is important. 
The field will contain trajectories of phenomena, processes, theories and approaches that will 
attract new work through the dynamics of intertextualism: scientists will connect their work 
to entities that are already considered important in order to borrow importance to their own 
statements. If these become too dominant, they can go on behalf of other approaches. The 
conception of life and disease, and the methodology to study these, affect how one within a 
research field tries to accomplish the medical aims. As a result of the analytic approach of 
experimental molecular biology, that can be said to better at producing knowledge about 
constituents than at understanding biological systems, some phenomena are the subject of 
enormous amounts of attention. It could be that this focus on biological constituents go on 
behalf of an understanding of how biological systems react to and functions to states that the 
organism experience as normal or pathological.  
Taken together, these "blind zones" become important to consider when the knowledge 
produced in experimental life sciences shall be translated to other contexts. It brings us to the 
problem of validity and relevance of the experimental life-knowledge. 
3.4.2 Validity	  and	  relevance	  of	  experimental	  life-­‐knowledge.	  
When claiming the validity of a statement an important aspect is the limits of the validity: 
valid with respect to what? This will depend on what the statement claims. The statement 
"there exists a human NatC complex" aims at being valid with respect to the particular 
experimental system. The statement "the human NatC complex is a target for cancer 
treatment" aims at being valid with respect to patient treatment in a clinical setting. The 
validity of these statements both have to be tested experimentally, the first by setting up an 
experiment of the type described above, the second by clinical tests and so forth.  
This may seem straightforward if statements actually were separated in a clear-cut manner. 
But as there is implied medical relevance in the work of the NAT-group, the statement "there 
exists a human NatC complex" is also committed to having medical relevance. Why did we 
put effort into identifying a hNatC complex? Because it is medically relevant. The reason 
why it is medically relevant is that it is needed for normal cell growth, and removing it leads 
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to cell death. But this finding of potential medical relevance was done after the work of 
identification was done. Still, medical relevance was anticipated. 
Here I find a problem with the analysis of Rheinberger. He shows how epistemic things are 
produced in an experimental system, but he does not give account for how the implied 
validity with respect to relevance to life in general, and health in specific. The dynamic of 
the case that Rheinberger describes in "Towards a history of epistemic things" follows the 
same logic as we see in the NAT-project: one start out with a clinical problem, and one goes 
out on a 20 years venture of analysing sub cellular constituents. The possible findings are 
presupposed to be relevant for the initial clinical problem. Is this due to a belief that any 
information will be relevant for life in some way or another?  Indeed it is not often one hears 
scientists dismiss their work as irrelevant (although there may be many reasons for this).  
The experimental analysis, its inherent reductionism, and its presupposed relevance may 
reveal some blind spots in the experimental culture. Canguilhem criticizes the experimental 
analysis for removing what is essential about life, namely the state of the organism. When 
studying a protein, it is how the protein relates the organism as a whole that makes it 
meaningful to talk about the protein in a pathological sense. In the process of isolating, 
modeling, and analysis, the experimental molecular biologist has removed himself from the 
environment, organization, and totality of the organism. But the validity of statements from a 
specific experimental system must be translated back to the biological context, and as we 
have seen, this translation is not straightforward. This translation is not only in the form of 
clinical applications such as medicines, prognostic markers etc, based upon research, such as 
are found specialized in the field called "translational research". It is also concepts, facts, and 
rationales formulated within the field of research. And it contains the "blind zones" as 
described in previous section.  
Indeed, translation takes place constantly. But the premise that material analysis is an 
adequate starting point of such a translation brings with it some theoretical considerations 
that Strand formulated as the in vitro/in vivo problem (Strand, 2003): when statements are 
moved from an analytic molecular biological setting into a clinical setting, it is moved to a 
more complex system. How the statement will relate to this system cannot be predicted in a 
straightforward manner. We cannot predict how the biological phenomena will relate to the 
biological context. 
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3.5 Summary:	  the	  theory-­‐practice	  of	  experimental	  life	  knowledge.	  
In this part I have attempted to give an account of how experimental molecular medicine 
produce knowledge. I have done this through looking at how conceptions, practices, values, 
social structures, individual capability, experimental systems, and social contexts interplay to 
produce statements about nature. My approach has been a near-sighted one, as it has been 
important for me to make a philosophical reflection that has been closely connected to the 
concrete scientific conduct. In this way I have aimed at accommodating the philosophical 
conceptions with concrete practice.  
The existence conditions for the experimental approach is the view that organisms can be 
understood exclusively through physiochemical laws, that the molecular constituents of 
living organisms forms the basis for health and disease, and that material analysis in the 
form of the controlled experiment will give us knowledge about diagnosis, prevention, and 
cure of disease. The controlled experiment further forms the validity condition for deciding 
whether statements about the molecular workings of organisms are true or not.  
As the experiment play an important role, the knowledge production to a large extent takes a 
practical approach, where the performance of the experiment is crucial for it to form the 
basis of statements. The performance of the experiment is dependent on individual skill, 
time, effort, and economical resources. Thus, there is a need to prioritize what experiments 
to, what kind of knowledge to produce. The choices made are dependent on factors such as 
the self-understanding of the group with respect to what is their subject of study, the 
expected outcome of the experiment as compared to expected effort, the expected relevance 
for health and disease - the position of the statements in the value field, and considerations 
with respect to publication, lengths of employment and similar. In this sense the knowledge 
produced is also a product of practical considerations.  
The need for making priorities throughout the research process is also reflected in the 
temporal dynamic of the research. As the experimental system can take both stabilizing and 
destabilizing function, that is that the experimenter can use the experimental system both to 
register new phenomena, resistances and differences, but also to stabilize and frame these 
phenomena through constructing more experimental setups aiming at the production of the 
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same phenomenon, and repeat these, the researcher has also a choice of whether he/she 
should open up the experimental system or close it in. 
The concrete experimental situation is a thought-practice where the experimenter works 
within a theoretical-material matrix of understanding, where the technological and material 
constituents are given theoretical understandings. This allows the researchers to think within 
the matter, and thus be able to produce new phenomena. The experimental system creates 
spaces of representation, where new phenomena are represented in a manner that can be 
understood within the matrix of understanding. In this situation the material agency can react 
or manifest itself in ways that the researchers had not anticipated on the background of their 
previous understanding. This will then represent a resistance to their understanding, and 
through a process of tuning they will try to adapt their theoretical-practice. The scientists 
will adjust their understanding of the phenomena and the experimental setup for studying it 
in a manner so that the experimental output can be used to determine the validity of a 
statement about the phenomenon.  
Experimental molecular medicine thus creates knowledge within a physiochemical, 
analytical matrix of understanding and practice. The concrete knowledge that is produced is 
the result of the theoretical-material understanding, the value field of medicine, the topology 
of the value field as a result of the relation between theory-practice and values, practical and 
tactical experimental considerations, and resistances in the material. 
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4. Re-thinking the theory-practice of molecular 
medicine. 
In part 3 I developed an understanding of the knowledge production in experimental 
molecular medicine that aimed to capture the hybrid aspect of this knowledge production. 
One of the central insights from that discussion is that there is a connection between the 
conception of life and the approach chosen to study life. The aim of this work was first to 
reflect upon the knowledge production within this scientific field, and secondly to see if such 
reflection opens for a reflexive life knowledge. I will here address the second question: can 
the philosophical reflection of knowledge production in experimental molecular medicine be 
developed into a reflexivity within the science itself, that can change the practice of that 
specific science? 
With regard to the second aim I would like to emphasize that since experimental molecular 
medicine is a theory-practice, a development of conceptions must be done simultaneously as 
the development of an approach. There must be a co-production of theory and practice, and 
this theory-practice needs to go through the process of mangling to develop and find its 
form. 
In this part I discuss how a re-thinking of the conceptions of life can open for new types of 
molecular medicine. First, I will see how George Canguilhem from his critique of the 
material analysis develops his concept of normativity as a central aspect of life. Secondly, I 
discuss what conceptions of life and health except for the physiochemical-analytic theory-
practice that can be found in the molecular life sciences. Last I will see whether there exist 
alternative lines of thought that can be tied together with the work of Canguilhem, this in 
order to form an alternative to the physiochemical-analytic theory-practice. 
4.1 Georges	  Canguilhem:	  the	  normativity	  of	  life.	  
The importance of the works of Canguilhem in this context is twofold. First, through his 
criticism of Bernard, Canguilhem reveals some of the conditions that made possible the 
experimental approach, and he shows that the conditions and approach are intrinsically 
connected. This aspect of the philosophy of Cangilhem can form a basis for a self-reflective 
theory-practice within the science itself, where values, presuppositions, conceptions, and 
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practice can be included in the same reflective thought-practice. Secondly, through handling 
both the conceptions of life and discussing the approaches used for studying life Canguilhem 
also opens for a simultaneous re-thinking of the conceptions and the approaches. As was 
mentioned in part 1, Canguilhem states that scientific concepts are used as tools to pose 
scientific questions. Scientific concepts can be used in different scientific contexts to open 
for new ways of understanding. The development and use of concepts raise questions, and 
these questions find their explanation in the form of scientific theories (Resch, 1992 p. 180). 
An example is the import of the term "information" from informatics to molecular biology, 
which led to the theory of genetic information storage and information transfer. Thus, if we 
want to re-think the scientific theory-practice and develop new ways of scientific thinking, 
an important part of the job is the development and discussion of scientific concepts.  
Maybe the most important insight from Canguilhem with respect to the development of 
scientific concepts is the notion of biological normativity as characteristic of life. Here, I will 
discuss two of his works, namely "The Normal and the Pathological" (Canguilhem, 1991), 
where he analyzes the sciences of physiology and pathology, and "Knowledge of Life" 
(Canguilhem, 2008), where he looks at biology and the study of life in general. Through a 
discussion of these works I will see how Canguilhem develops the concept of normativity as 
an alternative to Bernard's concept of normality, and thus creates a new frame of reference 
for understanding health and disease. 
4.1.1 Conceptions	  of	  normality	  and	  pathology.	  
In his work "The Normal and the Pathological" (Canguilhem, 1991) from 1943 (and 
expanded in 1966) Canguilhem performed a historical analysis of medicine, where he traced 
the medical concepts and approaches, and how these were constituted. Medicine, stated 
Canguilhem, came from a therapeutic need. Disease had always had a strong impact on the 
life of humans, and throughout the history of medicine the conceptions of disease and 
therapy took various forms.  
The positivists had a statistical understanding of pathology. For Bernard, the relation 
between the normal and the pathological state was a homogenous one (Bernard, 1957 p. 
146). The pathological state was a quantitative modification of the normal state, and every 
pathological state had a corresponding normal state (Bernard, 1877). But Canguilhem asked: 
if the pathological state is merely a quantitative modification of the normal state, where can 
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we draw the objective border between normal and pathological? For Bernard the normal was 
a constant frame of reference, but defining the normal in itself was not easy. Indeed, said 
Canguilhem, Bernard aimed at creating an objective pathology, but he did it through a 
conception of normality and pathology that abandoned the originality of normality and 
pathology in life. There is a qualitative difference between a normal and a pathological state. 
For the organism a pathological state is something qualitatively different from a normal state 
(Canguilhem, 1991 pp. 87-88). 
To understand how the pathological state differs qualitatively from the normal one, 
Canguilhem proposed we have to understand disease on the level of the total individual 
(Canguilhem, 1991 p. 108). The pathology manifests itself to the organism in the sense that 
the organism’s standards of living are somehow restricted. An alteration that does not lead to 
restriction will not in itself be seen as pathological. Thus, being sick leads to a qualitative 
change of life for the diseased (de Cuzzani, 2004).  
The state of disease as a restriction points at an important characteristic of life, namely that 
life is not indifferent to its state. In this lies the normativity of life. Canguilhem creates a 
conception of life: life is normative. It is something to which its state is not indifferent to 
itself (Canguilhem, 1991 p. 129). The biological normativity is an activity of the organism 
itself.   
The organism maintains its norm with respect to an environment. Organisms can live in 
environments that are more or less suitable. "Health" is a state where the organism manages 
to control and maintain its own norm within the environment it lives. The pathological state 
is marked by a change that makes it impossible for the organism to maintain its norm. Thus, 
it is biological normativity constitutes the existence of normal and pathological states in 
medicine. The biological normativity separates the life sciences from other natural sciences. 
There is no pathology for a quark; there is no pathology in chemistry or physics. The 
experience of pathological states can only be evaluated in terms of the relation between the 
environment and the organism’s adaptation to the environment: how does the organism react 
to disadvantageous states, and what are the margins of tolerance for change in state and 
environment (Canguilhem, 1991 p. 197)? The organism has a margin of tolerance for the 
inconsistencies of the environment, and can thus be healthy even when the environment 
changes.  
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Science describes the environment in terms of theoretical abstractions. But a living creature 
does not live among natural laws and abstractions. It lives among events that vary by these 
laws, in a world of possible events and unexpected resistances. The living being recognizes 
health only on the level of experience: in the opportunities in and tolerance of the 
environment. Humans feel healthy when they not only can tolerate the environment, but also 
affect it and themselves; when they are "more than normal", when they are able to establish 
new norms, new ways of life21. Humans feel diseased when they are hindered in this ability 
to affect their own life, when they are restricted. Thus, health and disease does not differ by 
biochemical properties, but by biological value. 
As medicine deals with health and pathology, medicine itself becomes a normative activity. 
Medicine must be understood as an effort of the human organism to manipulate with the 
potential states of the human organism in order to achieve more beneficial states. It is the 
spontaneous effort of the living being to dominate life and the environment, and organize 
this according to its values as a living being. It is here medicine find its meaning as a 
scientific activity. The development of therapy is a development of approaches for changing 
the state of the organism into a state where it better can maintain its norms. This is not a 
complete restoral of a "normal" state, as the organism will always be affected of its earlier 
states. To be cured is rather to develop new physiological constants and organizations for the 
organism to maintain a beneficial state (de Cuzzani, 2003 pp. 122-128). 
After defining normativity as a central aspect of life, the next question for Canguilhem was: 
does the experimental approach address these aspects of life? When the context is so 
important, in what sense are the laboratory standards appropriate to serve as the norm for the 
functional activity of the living being outside the laboratory? Canguilhem states that the 
functional norms of the living being, as they are examined in the laboratory, are only 
meaningful within the framework of scientific operative norms. The laboratory itself 
constitutes a novelty that cannot be directly interpreted back into the original environment of 
the organism. Animals subjected to experiments in a laboratory setting are put in a state of 
artificial pathology. The laboratory as an environment itself establishes new norms.  The 
                                                
21 This conception of the normal bears resemblances to Sartre's conception of freedom, as presented in Being and 
Nothingness. Sartre here explains freedom as the ability to constitute a new meaning for oneself as a self (Gutting 2001 p. 
139). For both Canguilhem and Sartre it is the transcendence of ones earlier self that is central for the normativity or 
freedom of the individual, respectively. 
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material analysis gives observations about different states of the organism, and these states 
can be said to more or less be associated with a pathological state on an organism level. But 
for a cell in a human body it gives as little sense to talk about a pathological state. As 
Canguilhem puts it: 
"To look for disease at the level of cells is to confuse the plane of concrete life, where biological 
polarity distinguishes between health and disease, with the plane of abstract science, where the 
problem gets a solution" (Canguilhem, 1991 p. 223). 
As the material analysis does not address the basic medical problem it should not be the 
basis of medicine. To understand the qualitatively different experience of disease, we must 
understand the conditions under which organisms are able to maintain their norms, their 
normativity. Rather than to split up and analyze the underlying constituents of organisms in 
physiochemical terms, one should aim at a life science that understands the original 
normative aspects of organisms. 
4.1.2 Life	  science	  and	  the	  characteristics	  of	  life.	  
In the work "Knowledge of Life" (Canguilhem, 2008) from 1952 and expanded in 1965 and 
1992, Canguilhem addresses the topic of life science in relation to life more in general than 
in "The Normal and the Pathological". What are the characteristics of the living, and what 
demands does these put on the sciences that have the living as their object?  
Canguilhem starts with describing science itself as a part of the normative activity of life. 
The motivation for enquiring knowledge is a search for security through reduction of 
obstacles. With the construction of theories through a process of assimilation we can re-
organize the human life and its relation to the world. The universal relation between human 
knowledge and living organization is shown through the relation between knowledge and 
human life. It is this perspective that allows humans to attribute value to facts: by 
distinguishing those facts that have a real relation to the organism from those that are 
indifferent to it (Canguilhem, 2008 p. xx).  
As described in "The Normal and the Pathological" the life sciences reflect their object of 
study. The authenticity of biological knowledge lies in that the biological concepts form a 
kind of mimesis where they are designed to represent and describe the organism. This 
mimesis can be said to be due to some special problems stemming from the complexity of 
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the biological, leading to some methodological considerations that need to be taken into 
account in the life sciences (Canguilhem, 2008 pp. 11-15): 
1. Specificity. The specificity of an observed biological phenomenon limits all logical 
generalizations in ways that cannot be foreseen. Thus, there are reservations in all 
generalizations made about organisms. 
2. Individualizations. Organisms are individuals, and they vary. This makes it challenging to 
find representative objects of study. 
3. Totality. Given that an organism is a totality that is changed with every attempt of 
removal: it possible to analyze what determines a phenomeon by isolating it? 
4. Irreversibility. Organisms have irreversibility to them: they develop and change with time. 
This makes chronological extrapolation and prediction hard.  
The individuality of organisms, together with the irreversibility of biological phenomena, 
limits the possibility to repeat and reconstruct the conditions of a certain phenomenon. With 
the points 1-4 given above in mind Canguilhem again rises the question of whether the 
experimental physiochemical approach to biology gives us the most important answers about 
life. Will the knowledge resulting from experimental medicine give us an understanding of 
the original aspects of life, and of health and disease as normative states?  
Through the physiochemical approach Canguilhem argues that biology devaluates its own 
specificity. If one wants to capture the originality of life, it would have to be through the 
originality of the total experience. The physiochemical sciences have determined laws 
between objects without a point of reference. But as organisms are not indifferent to their 
state due to their inherit normativity, the relation between the milieu, both internal and 
external, is important for understanding the organism itself. It is the living being's 
experiences with the milieu that gives meaning for the organism. It is this totality of relations 
between the organism and milieu that must be the frame of reference for knowledge of life.  
Canguilhem brings forth the term vitalism to restore the independence of biology. The term 
vitalism is problematic as it was used for the special vital forces that Bernard fought against 
with the physiochemical approach. Canguilhem does not claim that there are such special 
natural laws for life. On the contrary he opposes such views. But the meaningful aspect of 
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vitalism, he says, is to look for meaning in the relation between life and science: life science. 
Canguilhem's vitalism is to look for the specific aspects of life that lies in life's polarity, 
normativity, and organization.  
This vitalism is anti-reductionist. A living being cannot be reduced to a crossroad of 
influences alone. It has its own meaning, and for the organism this meaning is being. Where 
as a machine would verify the norms of predictability, the living acts in accordance with 
indeterminism: it tolerates changes in the internal and external environment, and it lives by 
improvisation. These are necessary qualities for an organism, because an organism does not 
live in a world of abstract natural laws. It lives in a world of unforeseeable events and 
variations that occur in accordance with natural laws. From this point of view, meaning is an 
appreciation of values in relation to needs such as hunger or survival. For the organism that 
experiences the needs they are irreducible, and therefore an absolute system of reference. 
"Vitalism" is an expression of the self-identity of life within the living being that is 
conscious of life (Canguilhem, 2008 p. 62).  
4.1.3 A	  normative	  life	  science?	  
From Bernard and Canguilhem we see that the complex and normative nature of biology and 
experimental molecular medicine sets the agenda for how these sciences should be 
understood. I will here discuss how Canguilhem, through the establishment of normativity as 
a central characteristic of life22 also proposes a new conception of life, and a new life 
science.  
Bernard's solution to biological complexity, and to the medical aim of curing disease, is the 
controlled experiment: we don’t know what nature will look like before we have tested it, 
and the adequate method is the controlled analytic experiment. Bernard defines the 
boundaries of the experimental system by defining relevant and irrelevant factors: 
physiochemical properties are to be considered. Vital forces in the meaning of soul and 
similar, is not to be considered. 
Bernard’s description gives a scientific practice that both claims fecundity and validity, and 
that can be readily translated to practical work in other laboratories. This is indeed a great 
                                                
22 I here use the term "life" to designate what Canguilhem call "le vivant" ("the living"). 
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strength of Bernard's work. But the problem with this experimental reductionism is, in my 
opinion, that what was an approach, has turned into a dogma. For Bernard, biological 
systems could be explained fully by the underlying constituents and processes. Still, he was 
no full reductionist as he claimed that the organization of constituents in organic systems 
makes living organisms qualitatively different than the non-living. But a tendency in 
molecular biology and medicine has been to claim that a phenomenon can be fully 
understood by, or reduced to, the underlying constituents. One might say that since Bernard's 
grasp on totality was so much weaker than his proposed method of analysis, the practical-
theoretical philosophy of Bernard pointed out the direction of reductionism. Bernard warned 
about generalizers who did not know the specificities of biology. But in the heyday of 
experimental molecular medicine many experimenters themselves have become generalizers 
of methodology and concept. This may stem from a lack of self-awareness in Bernard's 
work: that his method itself contained values, interests, and a certain perspective. In 
establishing a methodology that is adequate for studying life, Bernard also establishes a 
certain view of life. It is this that Canguilhem points at in his analysis of experimental 
medicine.  
The strength of Canguilhem is his analysis of concepts: the principle of normativity of life 
and how this is reflected in medicine. Medicine becomes a normative science, where the 
special characteristics of life, namely normativity and totality, set the perspective in which 
medicine is conducted. Canguilhem criticizes Bernard's material analysis for being to 
reductionistic, and not take into account the organic totality in which health and disease 
makes sense. This is indeed a relevant criticism, and Canguilhem points at how life science 
would benefit from a larger emphasis on the totality of the organism. 
But in this we find some of the problems of Canguilhem's work: in developing a new view 
on life and disease, he also claims that this begs for a new life science. This life science 
should reflect the perspective of totality on health and disease. He draws the consequence of 
the interplay between how we view the world, and what values constitute this view. 
Canguilhem is not so much interested in how knowledge is produced in experimental 
medicine as in what kind of knowledge should be produced. But Canguilhem does not 
suggest how this could be dealt with practically. He sheds little light over the concrete 
process of knowledge production, and about how the road to the proposed new life science 
should be built. As Canguilhem does not go into the practical aspects of medical and 
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biological knowledge production, he also fails to raise his propositions of a new life science 
as a feasible alternative to Bernard's program, at least for the experimental life sciences. 
4.2 The	  tension	  between	  the	  reductionist	  approach	  and	  the	  complexity	  of	  life.	  
The material analysis with its inherent reductionism has had a strong influence on molecular 
medicine and the experimental life sciences. I have here tried to see how the experimental 
life sciences, although based on the material analysis, have tackled the complexity of 
biological systems. My suggestion is that even though there is a widespread view that the 
life sciences should be mechanical, analytical, and physiochemical, the life sciences has 
developed conceptions and practices to deal with the complexity and originality of life.   
4.2.1 There	  is	  a	  tension	  between	  the	  reductionistic	  and	  the	  integrative	  understanding	  
within	  the	  molecular	  life	  sciences.	  
There have been many attempts to define life, also in the age of molecular life science. 
Phenomena such as viruses have problematized what could be called living or not. Often, 
attempts of defining life list some characteristics that organisms must fulfill to be considered 
a living organism. For example, Nealson & Conrad list these characteristics that a 
phenomenon must have in order to be living: i) a structure for conversion of energy into a 
biologically useful form, ii) a unique chemistry associated with the structure (for terrestrial 
life this chemistry is carbon-based), iii) replication with fidelity, iv) evolution, v) energy 
consumption of energy for the building of its (complex) structure, vi) means to escape its 
own metabolic end-products (Nealson & Conrad, 1999). Koshland takes a somewhat 
different approach, suggesting seven kinetic and thermodynamic pillars of life: 1) Program, a 
plan that describes the ingredients and the kinetics of the living system, 2) improvisation, the 
ability to change the program in order to meet the events of the environment (it is here meant 
on the level of evolution of a group of individuals through mutation and selection), 3) 
compartmentalization in order to maintain the arrangement and kinetics of the system, 4) 
energy - life involves reactions that consume energy, 5) regeneration in order to compensate 
for thermodynamic and material loss, for example in the form of import of chemical 
substrates or mechanisms for maintenance of structure, 6) adaptability to the surroundings, 
as for example searching for food when deprived of nutrients, 7) seclusion, that is specificity 
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of constituents in order to allow for necessary reactions within the volume of the organism 
(Koshland, 2002). 
As I suggested in 3.1, one of the presuppositions of experimental molecular medicine is a 
belief that life and disease can be understood by its underlying physiochemical properties. 
This is reflected in the examples above by the emphasis on a distinct chemistry, the 
importance of chemical specificity, and the use of physiochemical terminology in the 
formulation of the characteristics. But in these examples we also see other conceptions of 
life that does not fit with a reductionistic understanding. Notions such as improvisation, 
replication and organization do not directly translate to a mechanical or physiochemical 
explanation. Such notions refer to organisms as organized and complex entities, and they do 
not have corresponding concepts within the inorganic sciences (as I know of). Thus, 
although the reductionistic approach has had a large impact within the experimental 
molecular life sciences, and for how these sciences understand themselves, there are other 
less pronounced conceptions of life within the experimental molecular life sciences. There is 
thus a co-existence between explaining life at a physiochemical level and the need for 
specific concepts and understandings that capture the complex organization of living 
systems. 
Rheinberger gives a striking example of the surprises that comes with complexity in 
biological systems, namely the introduction of information theory in genetics and molecular 
biology during the 1950s. Rheinberger quotes Mahlon B. Hoagland in that a vocabulary that 
included expressions from information theory formulated a new and clearer understanding of 
the field (Rheinberger, 1997 p. 157). In order to take the understanding from the analyzed 
constituents to the biological function, a leap in conceptual understanding was needed. This 
new understanding was the formulation of a synthesis that included another level of 
organization that the participating constituents. It did not come directly from the disciplines 
related to experimental molecular medicine or biology itself. Rather, the concepts came from 
informatics theory, cybernetics, and physics. The concepts of information transfer came from 
information theory, the notions of organisms as self-regulatory systems came from 
cybernetics (Rheinberger, 1990). In "What is life" from 1944 Erwin Schrödinger proposed 
that biological traits that were inherited from one generation to the next had to be stored in 
the physical structure of the organism, and that this structure somehow specifically was 
transferred to the next generation (Schrödinger, 1992 p. 61). Crick pointed at this as an 
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influence for his work on the DNA-structure (Rheinberger, 1990). This work of getting an 
understanding of what is today considered basic constituents and principles of molecular 
biology required a leap of conceptual understanding. The explanation of the biological 
macromolecules in terms of information storage and transfer introduces notions and 
conceptions that cannot be reduced to a lower level of complexity. There is a qualitative 
difference between the organization of the biological macromolecules in their biological 
context, and their building blocks. This difference is unique for living organisms. At the core 
of biological reductionism, organization plays a leading part. 
Michel Polanyi has argued that such irreducible leaps are found between many levels of 
biological organization (Polanyi, 1968). This is the background for the many disciplines of 
biology that analyze biological systems on different levels: molecular biology, cell biology, 
histology, physiology, embryology, ecology etc. They deal with different levels of biological 
organization. One cannot fully understand the molecular biological phenomena without 
seeing it in its biological context - an enzyme as part of a pathway or a cell as part of a 
tissue. And one cannot understand biological systems without seeing them as ways for the 
organism to maintain life in a world of more or less unprecedented events.  
4.2.2 Life	  science	  has	  developed	  approaches	  to	  tackle	  the	  originality	  of	  life.	  
Due to the originality of life, Canghilhems list some methodological considerations in the 
life sciences (section 4.1.2) that cause problems for a strictly reductionistic experimental 
approach. As presented in the last section, the molecular life sciences have developed more 
conceptions of life than the reductionistic and mechanical. I will here discuss how the points 
of Canghuilhem has been addressed practically in the molecular life sciences, before I in the 
next section see if these practices have a critical potential for the re-thinking of experimental 
molecular medicine. 
1. Specificity. The specificity, or more precise the functional specificity, of biological 
phenomena is reflected in the need to confirm statements experimentally. A biological 
phenomenon may be structurally similar in different contexts (e.g. the expression of a 
particular gene), while the functional specificity (the role and effect of that gene in the 
different context) may differ. The elaborate experimental effort within biology can be seen 
as a necessity in order to tackle the functional specificity of biological phenomena.  
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2. Individualisation. The individualization of organisms, both on a species and organism 
level, has been considered a factor that adds to the problems of general concepts. This has 
been met by standardized model systems, as so to allow for comparing. But as nature 
appears far from standardized this leads to a problem when considering the generality of the 
phenomena. There is indeed a tension between the need for standardization and the 
individualization of organisms, as well as the need to know the generality of an observed 
phenomenon. This can be done either by investigating the phenomena with respect to the 
general concepts that actually exist within the field qualitatively by a specific experiment, or 
quantitatively by the use of statistics. Alternatively, the individual nature of the phenomena 
is interesting itself, something that especially in medicine brings forth the large literature of 
case studies.  
The individual nature of organisms has also given rise to projects such as the 1000-genomes 
project (Africa, 2010), as well as the registration of genetic variations in the Single 
Nucleotide Polymorphism database23. The enterprise of personalized medicine can be 
viewed as a practical and clinical effort of tackling the individual nature of life and disease 
(see for example (Offit, 2011)). The aim of personalized medicine is to have sufficient 
knowledge of the causal factors of disease for each patient in order to tailor the treatment for 
each patient. For example, as the development and progression of cancer is a highly 
individual process, personalized cancer treatment would target not the cancer as a cell 
growth phenomenon per se, but rather target the concrete process of cancer development in 
that individual patient. In personalized medicine the dream of a full causal understanding of 
life takes a clear manifestation24. But also, personalized medicine is an acknowledgement of 
the individual nature of organisms, and of the causes and progression of states that become 
pathological for the individual organism. Thus, individualization is a problematic, but not 
un-addressed, aspect of life science. 
3. Totality. As an organism can be said to represent a totality that will be changed when 
disturbed, how can biological phenomena be studied by analysis? This is one of 
Canguilhem's main points of criticism against the experimental approach. Totality, or 
studying organisms as systems has been a focus within the relatively new area of the 
                                                
23 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/snp 
24 For an example from Norwegian scientists: http://www.forskning.no/artikler/2011/mai/288166  
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molecular life sciences that is called systems biology25. The rise of systems biology as a sub-
discipline has been enforced by large amount of experimental data that can be produced with 
current molecular biological techniques (allowing more variables to be studied 
simultaneously), the development of computer technology for modeling and integrating data, 
and theoretical biological works that has pointed on the need for a systematic understanding 
of biology (Hood, 2003; O’Malley & Dupré, 2005). This will be further handled in section 
4.3. 
4. Irreversibility. The irreversibility, or I will call the temporal specificity of organisms is the 
foundation of disciplines such as developmental biology (on a species-plane) as well as 
evolutionary biology (in the sense that evolution is an unidirectional process where the 
current state is directly dependent on previous states and events). We may say that organisms 
are temporally specific/organized, and that this organization is irreversible. Also, within the 
handling of model systems and molecular studies time plays a role. For model systems, the 
age of the organism must be considered. For molecular studies temporal processes such as 
cell cycle and circadian rhythms, and enzyme kinetics are all important subjects of study.  
Biology and medicine has thus dealt with many of the characteristics of their study 
organisms. On this level biology and medicine reflect the originality of life and organisms 
through two understandings of life: one that emphasizes the physiochemical aspect, with 
focus on the causal mechanics of constituents, and one that sees the need to tackle the 
characteristics of life through an understanding of organization, context, and adaptation to 
the life-world of the organism. These conceptions often exist side by side, both shaping the 
conduct of the life sciences.  
4.3 Towards	  a	  new	  theory-­‐practice	  of	  molecular	  medicine.	  
Through stating that that the conceptions of the study object and the approach for studying 
this, is connected, Canghuilhem shows that through a critical analysis of the concepts it is 
possible to develop new conceptions, and perhaps new approach and practices based on 
these new conceptions. In this way the room for critical re-thinking is increased within the 
                                                
25 The study of biological contexts at various levels has a long history within other biological sciences such as for example 
ecology, which study the relations between organisms and their physical environment (Apple Dictionary Version 2.3.2 
Apple 2005-2009). 
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science. As the approach and conception is no longer seen as a rational or naturally given, it 
opens for a discussion and de-stabilization of the conditions of the knowledge production. 
Canghuilhem, Latour & Woolgar, Bachelard and Rheinberger give tools for putting the 
thought collective in perspective, for destabilizing the presuppositions of the knowledge 
production, and for creating spaces for intervention into the theory-practice. 
But why should the concepts of normality and disease, concepts that only are valid on the 
level of the total organism, be important for the molecular life sciences? The notion of 
normativity brings in a new perspective for which to understand biological systems, also on 
a sub-cellular and molecular level. If biological systems have developed into maintaining the 
normative state of the organism, we need an understanding of how the biological systems 
work at various organizational levels to do just this. What characterizes a molecular 
biological system that can react, buffer and tackle changes in environment, sudden events, 
damages and dangers?  
On the basis of Canguilhems critique of experimental medicine, and his development of the 
concept of normativity, I would suggest that experimental molecular medicine put a larger 
emphasis on understanding molecular constituents as functional parts of biological systems 
that have developed to maintain certain states of the organism. This means understanding 
how sub-cellular systems vary, react to, and buffer the events in the life of an organism. 
With respect to pathology it means understanding what state the systems are in when the 
organism has an experience of disease, and what mechanisms exist for restoring a desired 
state. When connecting the experience of disease on an organism-level with the molecular 
dynamics one will avoid a "molecular pathology" as one on a molecular level only will deal 
with different states of systems. On this level one cannot talk about "error" as this introduces 
values and meanings into a biological level of organization where such concepts do not make 
sense. On the molecular level there is only variation. 
The medical meaning must only be given with respect to the experience of disease of the 
individual. The frame of reference is not a "normal" or "abnormal" state, but rather the way 
the organism manages or fails to manage its normativity. The challenge will be to determine 
how biological systems are organized for the organism to maintain desired states. As 
biological systems have developed into tackling such conditions, this also affects the 
understanding of pathology. How much disturbance, variation, and change can a biological 
University of Bergen 
2011 
 91 
system take before the organism experiences a pathological situation? Emphasizing the 
system and the context, also on a molecular level, will change the trajectories for relating 
phenomena to health and disease within the field. A phenomenon will be valued with respect 
to how it relates to the biological context, by whether it is important or indifferent for the 
biological system. In this way, state and normativity can become an organizing principle for 
experimental molecular medicine.  
Another point is that to understand a molecular phenomenon in a context, there must be 
ways to transfer a phenomenon into different contexts. If NatC were studied in cell culture, 
how would the conclusions from that study translate into a tissue or organ-context, or to an 
individual context within personal medicine? Here, systems-to-systems understanding is 
needed. One might say that these are not molecular problems in themselves, but if we want 
to understand the parts and the whole, as is the goal for molecular medicine, these are the 
problems that are at the core of the medical aim of molecular medicine.   
Which methods will develop as good tools for studying life and health as a normative 
activity is beyond the scope of this work, as it is best handled in the development of the 
theory-practice through mangling (thereby the subtitle of this work: primers for a reflexive 
life knowledge). I will here only briefly suggest some possibilities. Important for these is 
that if they are to work as forces generating new thought-practices, they must succeed at 
becoming fecund trajectories within the medical value field.  
Experimentally, although challenging, the focus should change from single-constituent 
analysis to system-state understanding. The problem here, maybe even more than with 
single-constituent-studies, is the problem of generality and singularity. When understanding 
systems and states, there is a tension between the individual organization and a more general 
understanding of systems. Personalized medicine bears within itself an emphasis of disease 
as an individual state. Understanding how individuals can vary with respect to the 
organization of the biological systems can give understanding of how systems can be built 
and can vary to maintain a norm within different frames of variation.  
As was mentioned above, systems biology has developed as a sub-field that put emphasis on 
molecular and cellular context. An increased emphasis on totality and context, and the 
approaches used to study this, will change both the conception of biological systems as 
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conceptions of understanding and methods for studying biological systems are developed. 
(O’Malley & Dupré, 2005). Developing modeling tools for understanding experimental data 
is a potentially important supplement to experiments.  
The concept of normativity can be used as the basis for asking new questions in molecular 
medicine. By making normativity an organizing principle for biological systems, this begs 
for an understanding of how the biological systems are constructed to maintain the norm of 
the organism. Molecular medicine should therefore aim at studying how biological systems 
react to disturbance and variation, how they are constructed to meet the unanticipated events 
that make up the life of an organism, and what states underlies and connects to a 
pathological experience for the organism.  
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5.	  Conclusion.	  
Experimental molecular medicine has developed into a major scientific discipline. It has 
during the last 60 years had significant impact on health, and disease, and on the 
understanding of life. The introduction of molecular biological understandings and methods 
into many medical disciplines can indeed be called a paradigm shift of medicine. This work 
has both been a philosophical investigation of the knowledge production within experimental 
molecular medicine, and an effort to open experimental molecular medicine to a reflexive 
development of its concepts and approaches.  
Experimental	  molecular	  medical	  knowledge	  production	  is	  a	  hybrid	  activity.	  
The main aim of this study was to investigate how experimental molecular medicine 
produces knowledge. To address this I first discussed how Claude Bernard proposed the 
experimental approach as method for producing knowledge about the physiochemical 
processes underlying health and pathology. I then discussed how the historical epistemology 
described scientific activity as situated and conditional. From the works of Canguilhem, 
Rheibnerger, Latour& Woolgar and others, it became clear to me that the knowledge 
production is a hybrid activity. Worldviews, presuppositions, values, practical and tactical 
considerations, material agency, experimental systems and individual capability all 
participate to shape the resulting knowledge. In order to understand how knowledge is 
produced in experimental molecular medicine we must understand how these factors work 
together in a hybrid process. 
From the works presented in part 1 I did not get a sufficient integrative understanding of the 
hybrid aspect of knowledge production. In my opinion, there was a need to develop 
conceptions that could be used to simultaneously involve the above-mentioned aspects in an 
understanding of experimental molecular medicine. In order to address this, I used the 
conceptions presented in part 1, and a reflection over my own experimental work (part 2) to 
develop concepts and an understanding of the conditions, organization, and conduct of 
experimental molecular medicine, and of the knowledge that it produces. 
Even though I in this reflection tried to maintain some general lines of understanding, using 
specific cases will lead to a polyphony in the philosophical understanding of the scientific 
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work. It is as if the de-coherence of the scientific process itself is reflected in the 
philosophical enquiry. I believe that if other examples had been chosen as case studies, the 
outcome and conclusions of the philosophical work would also look different. This may go 
in behalf of the general overview, but it also emphasizes the claim of Bachelard and 
Rheinberger that instead of general understandings of science we should look for the local 
rationalities in scientific conduct. These local rationalities are also a result of the polyphony 
of our understanding of the world. When trying to conceive such rationalities or knowledge-
producing customs by philosophical reflection we should try to avoid overly generalizing 
concepts.  
In part 3 I develop an understanding of experimental molecular medicine as a theory-
practice. Experimental molecular medicine is based upon the physiochemical conception of 
life. The controlled experiment is the main argument for determining whether statements 
about the world are true or not. The experimental process is a process of mangling; where 
the scientists tune their experimental setups and theoretical understandings in order to 
accommodate the resistances the material agency gives in the system. Through the 
theoretical-material matrix of understanding of the experimental system and the knowledge 
surrounding it, scientists try to stabilize phenomena that can form the basis for making 
statements about the world. Through this process of mangling the theoretical-material matrix 
of understanding is constantly re-organized to include new and unanticipated 
understandings. 
The experimental process is a practical activity that demands time, effort and resources. In 
order to focus their work, scientists create a self-understanding of their work as a "research 
project" with a certain scope and certain. In the process of planning experiments, different 
economical, practical, rhetorical, and technical considerations are balanced. I emphasize two 
factors that affect which experiments and questions are pursued. The first is the variation of 
the openness and closedness in the project process. In order to efficiently produce new and 
robust statements the researchers must balance their project between subversive and 
hypothesis-generating phases, and phases of stabilizing phenomena and building support for 
statements. The second aspect is the value field of medicine. I have developed the concept of 
value field to describe the effect scientific aims have on the value that is ascribed to 
scientific statements. For medicine the value field is defined by health and disease: 
statements that are relevant for health and disease are considered more valuable than facts 
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that are irrelevant to health and disease. The concept of value field differs from a regular 
concept of relevance in that there may exist several aims in the same field, and the scientists 
position their work after one or more of these. In order to increase the value of their 
statements, scientists can attempt to connect their statements to established valuable 
knowledge within the field. In this manner trajectories are created and enforced within the 
field. Such trajectories can be seen as trend-topics and buzzwords throughout the scientific 
community. 
The	  concept	  of	  normativity	  can	  point	  to	  	  a	  new	  theory-­‐practise	  in	  molecular	  medicine. 
The second question posed in this work was whether a philosophical reflection over the 
knowledge production in experimental molecular medicine could lead to self-reflection and a 
subsequent change of the theory-practice within experimental molecular medicine itself? In 
part 4 I investigate whether Canguilhem's concept of biological normativity can open for 
new questions and understandings within experimental molecular medicine. I suggest that it 
is indeed possible to make normativity a central concept in the understanding of health and 
disease. If we see health and disease as constituted by the ability of the organism to maintain 
certain norms, normativity will form a trajectory within the value field of molecular 
medicine. Biological systems and phenomena must be given value with respect to whether 
they affect the ability of the organism to maintain a desired norm. To understand how 
organisms maintain their norms we need an understanding of how biological systems, also 
on the molecular level, are constructed to meet the challenges throughout the life of the 
organism. The development of such an understanding must come from a theoretical-practical 
process of mangling that take the biological normativity as its organizing principle.  
Some	  general	  considerations	  of	  this	  work.	  
This work started as a philosophical enquiry, but as it developed the works of biology and 
philosophy got more and more entangled. Conceptions from the philosophical reflection 
appeared as useful tools for planning, explaining and conducting my experimental work, and 
the experimental work and experience shaped the philosophical understanding of knowledge 
production. The work took a truly trans-disciplinary form.  
Being a practitioner of the life sciences, I have found many works, including Latour and 
Canguilhem, hard to apply to the theoretical-practical experimental life sciences. They do 
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not readily translate into the theory-practice of the experimental work. This has perhaps not 
been the aim for these works. But in my opinion, they then also loose relevance, and they 
make a divide between the philosophy of sciences and the sciences themselves that neither 
parts should be satisfied with.  
In his later work "We have never been modern" Latour mentions the post-modern view of 
knowledge as local and de-coherence (Latour, 1993). In the same work he argues for that de-
coherence veils the fact that different forms of knowledge are woven together in the social 
and political field. Latour states that as the different fields of knowledge have, mediation is 
needed to show how for example natural science affects the way we live our lives and 
conceive the world. Scientific activity and power needs to be challenged in its conceptions, 
values, and consequences. Therefore, an integrative understanding of the knowledge 
production is needed, 
In this sense, this work has also been a work of mediation. It has been an aim that this work 
should be as interesting and relevant to read both for philosophers and biologists. If I have 
succeeded I am not to judge, but I am not in doubt that the philosophy of science that was 
presented in the introduction of this work is important both to science and to society, but that 
significant amounts of its potential remains to be unleashed before it is readily translated 
into the practice-language of scientific theory-practice. Trans-disciplinary work is needed to 
develop scientific activity in such a way that it benefits from the insights of philosophy of 
science. 
In a famous quote, Marx claimed that philosophers interpret the world, but the aim is to 
change the world. Heidegger argued against this, saying that to change the world we must 
have a certain interpretation of it26. To this I will add, in all modesty, that intervention is a 
powerful way of changing interpretations. Experimental molecular medicine has changed the 
way we understand health and disease, the way we see ourselves as living beings, and our 
view of life in general. These changes come both through the ethical and political debates 
surrounding the field, but maybe most of all they come from the constant enrolment and 
production of new phenomena of life into the phenomenotechnical field of molecular life 
                                                
26 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jQsQOqa0UVc  
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science. This emphasizes the importance of a reflection over science that includes both the 
conditions, conceptions, practices, theories, and results of scientific activity. 
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